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Abstract  
ESSAYS ON MODELING OF BLIND PRINCIPAL BID BASKET  
TRADING COST 
by  
Tin Shan Suen  
 
Adviser: Professor Christos Giannikos 
The following is an executive summary of three essays on the modeling of the 
blind principal bid (BPB) basket trading cost, each focusing on different issues. The first 
essay, “How does a liquidity provider price a blind principal bid basket – An empirical 
perspective,” investigates various determinants of the blind principal bid basket trading 
cost. I extend Kavajecz and Keim’s (2005) model by identifying the price determinants 
based on the liquidity provider’s behavior. The model developed in the first essay, 
however, is not a structural model because it is not based on any theoretical framework. 
That is addressed in the second essay, “Two theoretical models for blind principal bid 
basket trading cost.” Both structural models in the second essay are based on well-
defined theoretical frameworks for modeling the trading cost of blind principal basket. 
The key insight in the second essay is the similarity between a dealer’s spread and the 
trading cost of blind principal bid. I extend the two dealer’s spread model developed by 
Stoll (1978a, 1978b) and Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) to model blind principal bid 
basket trading cost.  
 v
The third essay, “Manager’s Decision to Trade Blind Principal Bid Basket – a 
behavioral perspective,” investigates an asset manager’s choice between traditional 
agency trade and blind principal bid for executing a basket of stocks. I look at a 
manager’s choice based on decision theory, with a behavioral perspective. I test both 
prospect theory and expected utility theory in modeling a manager’s choice. The results 
indicate stronger empirical support for prospect theory than for expected utility theory 
and show that prospect theory provides a better explanation of the observed decisions 
made by managers.  
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Chapter 1 
Institutional Description of Trading Blind Principal Bid 
Baskets 
1.1. Institutional Description of Trading Blind Principal 
Bid Basket 
This chapter provides a detail institutional description of trading blind principal bid 
(BPB1) basket since many people may not familiar with this special kind of trading 
mechanism. It also provides a background for the questions that I am going to investigate 
in chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4. BPB2 is a form of basket trading. It is a mechanism 
that brings together the liquidity demander (i.e., buy side money managers3) and the 
liquidity provider (i.e., sell side BPB brokers). Traditionally, basket trading is related to 
index arbitrage and the basket of stocks being traded usually tracks a given index (e.g., 
S&P 500). BPB is often used by quantitative money managers to rebalance their portfolio 
regularly and execute simultaneously the sell and buy trades in one basket as a single 
transaction. Unlike the case of index arbitrage, BPB basket usually does not track a 
particular index. We can describe BPB from two perspectives: first as an auction; second 
                                                 
1 I shall use BPB as an abbreviation of blind principal bid for the rest of the document. 
 
2 Often referred to loosely as basket trading, program trading, risk trading. 
 
3 We use liquidity demander and buy side money managers interchangeably throughout 
this dissertation. 
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as a price discovery process, which defines execution price for each stock in a basket. 
Additional institutional descriptions of BPB can be found in Almgren and Chriss (2003) 
and Kissell and Glantz (2003, chapter 10). 
 
1.1.1. BPB as an auction 
As its name indicates, BPB is basically an auction. The bid submitted by a competing 
broker to a money manager for consideration is a liquidity risk premium that a broker 
charges a manager for trading a whole basket of stocks as a single transaction. This 
premium compensates the broker for providing two services. First, the broker provides 
liquidity to the manager so that all the trades in the basket will be executed 
simultaneously in a timely manner as a single transaction. Second, the broker commits 
his own capital in order to provide the liquidity. Such commitment exposes the capital to 
the risk of stock price movement. Prices of some of the stocks inside the basket may 
move adversely against the winning broker. Capital commitment makes this type of trade 
a principal trade rather than an agency trade (which does not require capital commitment 
from a broker). A bid submitted by a broker is usually quoted as cents per share. For 
example, if a broker submits a bid of 6 cents per share for a basket with 1 million shares, 
the money manager will pay $60,000 for trading the whole basket of stocks. In most 
biddings (auctions), there are several competing brokers, a broker with the lowest bid will 
win and execute all the trades in a basket. The number of competing brokers may range 
from 3 to 8. The auction is blind since the (stock) names inside the basket are not 
provided to competing brokers during the auction. Money managers do not want brokers 
to front-run some of the trades in a basket. Competing brokers, however, are given some 
overall information or description related to the basket under consideration. This is one of 
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the inputs that competing brokers use in formulating their bids. The money manager 
decides how much information he will make available to competing brokers, and such 
decisions can be tricky. If too little information is provided, brokers will submit higher 
bids reflecting higher (information asymmetry) risk involved. If too much information is 
given, brokers can potentially perform a reverse engineering and deduce some of the 
names in a basket4. In this event, the broker will charge an additional premium for if he 
wins the trade then other brokers may front-run him for some of the names in the basket. 
We shall describe below several possible bidding procedures that the money manager can 
use to minimize the risk of brokers front-running his trade. The following are some 
typical basket characteristics provided to bidding brokers. It is entirely possible that the 
manager might decide to distribute more or less information relative to the list below: 
• Dollar value of a basket (buy and sell) 
• Number of shares in a basket (buy and sell) 
• Number of names in a basket (buy and sell) 
• How well the basket tracks the S&P 500 index (buy basket, sell basket) 
• How well the buy basket tracks the sell basket 
• The volatility of the buy basket, sell basket, and the whole basket 
• The top 5 weights in a basket 
• Distribution of weight and number of names in various market capitalization 
buckets (buy and sell). For example, buy 10 names (with total weight of 4%) 
whose market capitalization is between $1 billion and $5 billion, sell 8 names 
(with total weight of 4.5%) whose market capitalization is between 1 billion and 5 
                                                 
4 On 12/16/2004, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page article, “Client Comes 
First? On Wall Street, It Isn’t Always So”, reporting the risk of front-running in BPB.  
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billion, buy 15 names (with total weight of 9%) whose market capitalization is 
more than $5 billion but less than $10 billion, etc.  
• Distribution of weight and number of names in various percentages of ADV5 
buckets (buy and sell). For example, buy 20 names (with total weight of 15%) 
whose percentage of ADV is less than 10%, sell 22 names (with total weight of 
19%) whose percentage of ADV is less than 10%, buy 5 names (with total weight 
of 11%) whose percentage of ADV is equal to or larger than 10% but less than 
20%, etc.  
• The weight, number of names, and weighted average percentage of ADV  in each 
sector (buy and sell). 
There are some commonly used standard reports that can be used to provide basket 
information to bidding brokers6. 
1.1.2. Price discovery process 
Price discovery process for the execution prices is relatively simple in BPB. For an 
agency trade, execution price is unknown before a trade is executed. However, this is not 
the case in BPB. Execution price for each name in a basket is contractual. Unlike an 
agency trade, the money manager and bidding brokers have agreed on what will be the 
execution price for each stock in a basket. There are many possible agreements. One of 
the agreements is known as post-close bidding. Basket characteristics are distributed to 
bidding brokers right after the market closes, and the agreed upon execution prices are 
                                                 
5 Percentage of ADV refers to the dollar value of a trade expressed as a percentage of the 
average daily dollar (trading) volume. A trade that has a high percentage of ADV 
generally requires more liquidity and, hence, it is more difficult to trade.  
 
6 The most commonly used is StockFacts developed by Citigroup. 
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the same day closing prices. Another example is known as pre-open bidding. Basket 
characteristics are distributed to competing brokers before the market opens, and the 
agreed upon execution prices are the previous business day’s closing prices7. In both 
instances, execution prices are stale prices, and this prevents brokers from front-running 
the money manager. There is one possible agreement under which the contractual 
execution prices are not stale prices8. Basket characteristics are distributed to competing 
brokers when the market is open. Execution prices for the stocks in the basket will be the 
mid-quote at the time when the basket is awarded to the winning bidder. In this case, the 
execution prices are “fresh”, and it is difficult for the winning bidder to front-run the 
money manager. However, if competing brokers who lost the auction can reverse 
engineer some of the names in a basket, the winning broker will still be exposed to some 
potential front-running risk. Another possible agreement, which is no longer popular, is 
to distribute the basket characteristics while the market is open and the agreed upon 
execution prices are the same day closing prices. In this case, the money manager may 
have the risk that the broker might front-run the manager’s trade. The following is a 
typical sequence of events for a bidding process: 
1. Basket characteristics report is sent to competing brokers. 
2. After reviewing the report, competing brokers submit their best bid (usually 
quoted as cents per share). 
                                                 
7 There is a variant for this post-close and pre-open bidding scheme. Assuming the 
winning bid is 5 cents per share, the contractual execution price can be booked as: (1) 
closing price + 5 cents for buy trade, or (2) closing price – 5 cents for sell trade.  If we 
look at the winning bid in this manner, it resembles the half spread of a dealer’s stock 
quotes. We shall discuss this variant in chapter 2 and chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
 
8 The BPB basket data we collected for this dissertation does not include this type of 
agreement.  
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3. Typically, the basket is awarded to the broker with the lowest bid. 
4. Names within the basket and the corresponding trades are provided to the winning 
broker. 
5. At this point the money manager can regard trading of the basket completed or 
executed (i.e., manger’s portfolio is re-balanced). From a manager’s perspective, 
there is practically no non-execution risk, and opportunity costs (of trades that are 
not done at manager’s desired time) are minimal. 
6. The winning broker will add all trades in a basket into his inventory and may start 
unwinding the trades he just got from winning the basket. Potentially, he can also 
cross some of these trades with his existing inventory. 
In summary, BPB is a special trading mechanism for specific managers whose profiles 
match some of the preceding criteria. For managers whose trades have no immediacy, 
then, BPB may not be appropriate. A broker charges a liquidity risk premium because he 
is exposed to various kinds of risk when providing liquidity. At the same time, the broker 
has a competitive advantage in managing some of these risk exposures. 
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Chapter 2 
How does a liquidity provider price a blind principal 
bid basket – An empirical perspective  
2.1. Introduction 
According to a report by Greenwich Associates (2005), the total volume of portfolio 
trading executed by 128 of some of the largest and most active equity trading institutions 
in the United States in 2005 was approximately $1.03 trillion. About 13% of this volume 
(i.e., $133.9 billion) was traded using BPB. Academic research in this area, however, has 
been limited. One contribution of this dissertation is to increase our understanding of the 
pricing aspect of this type of trading mechanism. We collected data for two hundred and 
eighty baskets that were traded using BPB. Using regression analysis, we identified a set 
of determinants related to the cost of trading using BPB. By modeling the behavior of the 
liquidity provider, we are able to identify a set of determinants related to the pricing of a 
BPB basket.  
 
This study differs from the well-known study by Kavajecz and Keim (2005) in one major 
aspect. Our study identifies a new set of pricing determinants based on how the liquidity 
provider perceives his risk exposure. Determinants from Kavajecz and Keim (2005) are 
based solely on the characteristics of a blind principal bid basket. Some of our 
determinants come from the trading environment (for example, trading during earnings 
announcements season) and are unrelated to the characteristics of a basket. Moreover, our 
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study focuses on a much larger sample. Another contribution of this study is the 
argument that the role of liquidity provider in BPB is very similar to the role of market 
maker (or specialist). This leads to an important conclusion that modeling a market 
maker’s quoted spread should be very similar to the modeling of BPB pricing. The 
quoted stock spread is market maker’s compensation in taking inventory risk and adverse 
selection risk. In fact, the BPB pricing determinants identified in this study are all fall 
into these two risk categories. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 consists of a brief review of the 
literature. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the methodology and data used in this study. 
Section 2.5 presents a discussion of the result highlighting both the similarities and 
differences of our results with those documented in Kavajecz and Keim (2005). Section 
2.6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2. Literature Review 
Since data related to blind principal bids is usually proprietary and, hence, difficult for 
researchers to obtain, there are not many empirical studies on this trading mechanism. 
However, Kavajecz and Keim (2005) managed to obtain one set of BPB data (provided 
by a money manager who uses BPB regularly). There are some similarities and 
differences between their study and ours. They argue that using BPB results in a 
transaction efficiency gain and the estimated transaction cost saving is about 62 basis 
points. Both their paper and this paper have the same dependent variable in the regression 
analysis – the winning bid. However, in Kavajecz and Keim’s study, their independent 
variables are limited to the basket’s characteristics. The independent variables we 
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investigate relate to several categories of risk exposure faced by the liquidity provider, 
and we try to model these exposures. We shall elaborate this point in more detail in 
Section 2.3 on methodology. Our sample size is bigger than that in Kavajecz and Keim 
(2005). In their study, they collected 83 observations (baskets) from one money manager. 
We collected 280 observations from two money managers. Our sample includes both 
large-cap baskets and small-cap baskets.  
 
There are many similarities between the role of a dealer and a BPB broker. One of the 
most important roles is to provide liquidity to the market participants (e.g., money 
managers) so that their immediacy is satisfied. In the case of a dealer, the immediacy is 
just for one single name; while for a BPB broker, the immediacy is for a basket of names. 
A stock’s spread is the dealer’s fee for providing liquidity, and a BPB basket’s liquidity 
risk premium is the BPB broker’s fee for providing liquidity. Conceptually, spread and 
liquidity risk premium are similar. Both dealer and BPB broker face similar issues in 
pricing their service of providing liquidity. Studies have shown that a stock’s spread can 
be decomposed into various components: Roll (1984), Choi et al. (1988), Glosten and 
Harris (1988), Stoll (1989), George et al. (1991), Lin et al. (1995), Madhavan et al. 
(1995), and Huang and Stoll (1997). Two of the components, inventory and information 
asymmetry, have received much attention in market microstructure literature. Many 
models have been developed to analyze the inventory component, for example: Garman 
(1976), Stoll (1978a, 1978b), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983), 
O’Hara and Oldfield (1986), and Laux (1995). Many models have also been developed to 
investigate the information asymmetry component, for example: Kyle (1985), Copeland 
 10
and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987), and Admati 
and Pfleiderer (1988). In essence, a dealer and a BPB broker face similar issues when 
they try to price the spread and liquidity risk premium respectively, in particular, the 
issue of inventory risk and information asymmetry risk. We will incorporate this insight 
into our research methodology as described in the next section.    
2.3. Methodology 
In this section, we describe the methodology used for investigating the pricing 
determinants of BPB basket. First, we define the dependent variable. Second, we discuss 
how to identify the set of pricing determinants that we are going to test. Our methodology 
is similar to the one used in Kavajecz and Keim (2005), but, the rationale for identifying 
various independent variables is quite different. Independent variables used in this study 
are proxies for inventory risk and information asymmetry risk faced by a BPB broker. 
Examples of sources of inventory risk are stock volatility and time needed to unwind the 
inventory. Since BPB brokers do not know exactly what is in a basket during bidding, 
this is an example of information asymmetry between manager and broker. Moreover, if 
a manager is going to add value, some of his trades in a basket are, by definition, 
informed trades. As discussed in the section on literature review, when a BPB broker 
provides liquidity (to satisfy immediacy), he is also exposed to these two sources of risk. 
Naturally, we would expect a BPB broker to ask for compensation. Our methodology is 
also similar to that used by Stoll (2000) to identify a list of determinants related to price 
of immediacy when trading a single name. In this study, we try to identify a list of 
determinants related to price of immediacy when trading a basket of names. Cross-
 11
sectional regression is used by Kavajecz and Keim (2005), Stoll (2000), as well as by this 
study to perform the analysis.  
2.3.1. Dependent variables 
The dependent variable of our regression analysis is the winning bid of a BPB basket. 
The winning bid is defined as a ratio:
basket a of size dedollar tra Total
broker a  topaidcost  Total . Total cost paid equals 
the winning bid (quoted in cents per shares) times total number of shares in the basket 
plus a fixed commission per share (if any). Total trade size is evaluated using the latest 
available closing prices (relative to the bidding date). The ratio is expressed in basis 
points. This definition is conceptually similar to a stock’s proportional quoted half-
spread, which is the dependent variable for the price of immediacy regression conducted 
by Stoll (2000).  
2.3.2. Independent variables 
We try to identify potential determinants by modeling brokers’ behavior. We put 
ourselves in their position of pricing a basket and try to identify various sources of risk 
that a winning broker will be exposed to. The winning bid is a function of how these 
various risk exposures are compensated. We classify various sources of risk in four 
categories: 
1. Market liquidity risk, 
2. Idiosyncratic stock risk, 
3. Basket characteristics risk,  
4. Bidding procedure risk. 
Even as we use different risk labels, all these risk exposures can be reconciled back to 
two basic categories: (1) inventory risk and (2) information asymmetry risk. As 
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mentioned above, these two types of risks are fundamental in explaining a stock’s spread. 
We will show that these two types of risk can also explain a basket’s winning bid. All the 
determinants and proxies described below can also be regarded as proxies for inventory 
risk or information asymmetry risk or both. We decided to use this new set of labels 
because they are more descriptive and more intuitive for identifying price determinants in 
the context of pricing a BPB basket.  
2.3.2.1. Market liquidity risk 
We tested one determinant in this category – the market-wide liquidity. The proxy for 
market-wide liquidity is defined as9: 
 volume)NASDAQ of average moving days 20   stocks listed NASDAQfor  weight  trade(Total
  volume)NYSE of average moving days 20   stocks listed NYSEfor  weight  tradeTotal(
Proxy Liquidity Market 
×
+×
=
     (2.1) 
The expected sign of the estimated coefficient for this proxy should be negative. If the 
market is more liquid, there will be less risk for the winning broker (and vice versa). This 
is because the broker will need less time to unwind the trades in a basket. One can also 
regard this determinant as a proxy for inventory risk. 
2.3.2.2. Idiosyncratic stock risk 
If a basket is not well diversified or news appears relevant for some of the stocks in a 
basket, the broker will face a higher stock idiosyncratic risk. We tested two determinants 
in this category: (1) basket lumpiness and (2) earnings announcement season.  
 
Basket lumpiness 
                                                 
9 Total trade weights refer to the sum of sell and buy trade weights. NYSE volume data is 
from Bloomberg, and the corresponding Bloomberg ticker is MVOLNE. NASDAQ 
volume data is from Bloomberg, and the corresponding Bloomberg ticker is MVOLQE. 
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If a basket is concentrated in a handful of stocks, the winning broker will face higher 
idiosyncratic stock risk. The broker will incur great loss if prices for these concentrated 
stocks move adversely against the broker. Moreover, high concentration may also imply 
potentially a longer time to unload these names. From a broker’s perspective, lumpiness 
translates into higher risk and, therefore, higher bid for a lumpier basket. We define 
basket lumpiness as: 
Price Share Average
Basket  theof Size Trade Total  Weight)Trade (Total
  LumpinessBasket 1
i∑
=
×
=
TopThree
i       (2.2) 
 
This determinant is defined as an estimated number of shares for the top three names10 (in 
terms of weight) in a basket. Although the names in a basket are not given to competing 
brokers, they can use the formula above to gauge the lumpiness of a basket. The reason to 
define lumpiness in this particular way is to simulate brokers’ thinking and analysis. The 
estimated coefficient for this determinant should be positive. One can also regard this 
determinant as a proxy for the information asymmetry risk. If a basket is lumpy, it may 
imply that a manager is making a bigger bet in some of his stocks and is trying to buy (or 
sell) these names aggressively. If a manager’s bet is going to be correct (i.e., informed), it 
will translate into a big information asymmetry risk from a broker’s perspective. 
 
Earnings Announcement Season 
After a stock reports its earnings, it is not uncommon for its price to have a big jump (up 
or down). Therefore, during earnings announcement season, the broker is potentially 
                                                 
10 Managers and brokers also refer to these names in a basket as the most prominent 
issues (or the prominent trades). Usually trade weight for these names is provided to 
competing brokers by the manager. 
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exposed to higher idiosyncratic stock risk. Hence, brokers charge more for the liquidity 
risk premium during earnings announcement season11. The proxy for earnings season is 
defined as a dummy variable whose value is set to one if one of the following criteria is 
true, otherwise, it is set to zero. 
• The date of bidding is in February. 
• The date of bidding is within the last 7 calendar days before the end of April, July, 
or October. 
• The date of bidding is within first 14 calendar days after the end of April, July, or 
October. 
The proxy is constructed on the observation that most companies end their fiscal year in 
December. A company whose fiscal year ends in December typically reports its (audited) 
earnings during February. For interim quarterly (i.e., end of March, June, and September) 
earnings report, an announcement typically comes three to six weeks after each 
(calendar) quarter end. The estimated coefficient for this dummy variable should be 
positive. One can also think of this dummy variable as a proxy for information 
asymmetry risk. If a manager is informed, then he will buy stocks with positive earnings 
surprise expecting the stocks’ prices to go up after the stocks’ earnings announcement, 
and he will sell (or short) stocks with negative earnings surprise expecting the stocks’ 
prices to go down after earning announcements. 
                                                 
11 Yohn (1998) finds that bid-ask spread gradually increase prior earnings 
announcements. 
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2.3.2.3. Basket characteristics risk 
Basket characteristics risk refers to the fact that brokers find some baskets easier to trade 
than others, and some baskets less risky than others. Therefore, the winning bid is a 
function of these basket characteristics. We tested four determinants in this category: 
1. Count of high percentage of ADV from top 3 prominent trades, 
2. Small-cap trades, 
3. Sector imbalance, 
4. High percentage of ADV concentration. 
 
Count of high percentage of ADV from top 3 prominent trades 
This determinant is defined as the number of names among the top three biggest positions 
(in terms of trade weight) whose trade size (in dollars) is more than 50% of ADV. ADV 
is defined as the average daily volume (in dollars) for the last 10 trading days. By 
definition, the range for this determinant is from 0 to 3. A prominent trade combined with 
high percentage of ADV means higher risk for a broker. Therefore the estimated 
coefficient for this determinant should be positive. 
 
Brokers cannot know the exact value of this determinant, but they have some information 
that will allow them to make an educated guess. For example, they know the total weight 
of trades that are more than 50% of ADV12. If this weight is less than the weight of any 
one of three prominent trades, then they know that none of the three prominent trades in 
the basket is more than 50% of ADV (which means less risk from a broker’s perspective). 
If the total weight of the trades that are more than 50% of ADV is larger than any three of 
                                                 
12 This information is provided to brokers through, say, a StockFacts report. 
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the prominent issues, then it is possible that some of the prominent trades are also a high 
percentage of ADV trade.  
 
We think that this determinant is a proxy for both inventory risk and information 
asymmetry risk. The prominent names may be due to an informed manager. Even if the 
prominent names do not imply an informed manager, high ADV alone will translate into 
higher inventory risk for these prominent names. This is because longer time is needed to 
unwind these prominent names from a dealer’s inventory. 
 
Small-cap trades 
As a rule of thumb, small-cap stocks are more difficult to trade since they tend to be less 
liquid than large-cap stocks. More trades coming from small-cap stocks mean that a 
broker needs more time to unwind these trades. Longer trading time means higher risk 
and, therefore, a higher bid. The proxy for this determinant is defined as: total number of 
shares traded coming from companies whose market capitalization is less than $500 
million. Typically, this information is given to the brokers. The estimated coefficient for 
this determinant should be positive. This proxy is also a proxy for inventory risk, since 
more time is needed to trade small-cap stocks while, which tend to be more volatile, as 
well. 
 
Sector imbalance 
If there is a net buy (or net sell) for a sector, then there is a directional bet in that sector. 
From a broker’s perspective this translates into a sector imbalance risk. On the other 
hand, if buys and sells (in terms of trade weights) are about the same, then the buy and 
the sell provide an internal built-in hedge against a sector movement. If this is the case, a 
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broker perceives it as a less risky exposure. The sector imbalance risk is a particular 
concern if the manager performs a sector rotation in his portfolio. Such rotation creates a 
BPB basket that has a net buy in several sectors and a net sell in other sectors. We model 
this sector imbalance risk by the following proxy: 13  
Net Trade weight for sector i = Buy weight – Sell weight, 
Max. net trade weight = maximum net trade weight among the sectors, 
Min. net trade weight = minimum net trade weight among the sectors,  
Proxy for the sector imbalance risk =  
Max. net trade weight – Min. net trade weight.     (2.3) 
We expect the estimated coefficient for this determinant to be positive. This proxy is also 
a proxy for information asymmetry risk. If a manger’s sector bet turns out to be correct 
(i.e., informed), then the winning broker will likely suffer. 
 
High percentage of ADV concentration 
Typically competing brokers are given total weights and the number of names distributed 
across various percentage ADV buckets. If high percentage ADV trades are concentrated 
among fewer names, then this is considered more risky from a broker’s perspective. We 
use the following three proxies for this determinant: 
 weight trade total thecontribute that stocks ofNumber 
200% above ADV of percentageth  weight wi tradeTotal3ion Concentrat
 weight trade total thecontribute that stocks ofNumber 
200% and 100%between  ADV of percentageth  weight wi tradeTotal
 2ion Concentrat
 weight trade total thecontribute that stocks ofNumber 
100% and 50%between  ADV of percentageth  weight wi tradeTotal
 1ion Concentrat
=
=
=
     (2.4) 
 
                                                 
13 Barra sector classification is used for the calculation of the proxy, and there are 13 
sectors in this classification. 
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The estimated coefficient for these proxies should be positive. In a relative sense, 
Concentration 3 indicates the highest risk. Therefore, we expect the following property 
for the estimated coefficients: coefficient for Concentration 3 > coefficient for 
Concentration 2 > coefficient for Concentration 1. 
 
These three proxies can also be proxies for inventory risk or information asymmetry risk 
or both. If the concentration is due to trading illiquid stocks, then it is a proxy for 
inventory risk (since more time is needed for unwinding). If the concentration is due to 
trading liquid stocks but the number of shares traded is large, then it is a proxy for 
information asymmetry risk (since the manager may be informed). If the concentration is 
due to trading illiquid stocks and the number of shares traded is large, then it is a proxy 
for both inventory risk and information asymmetry risk. 
2.3.2.4. Bidding procedure risk  
The BPB basket data we have collected used the following three bidding procedures: 
• Pre-open bidding 
• Post-close bidding 
• Intra-day bidding14 
In a relative sense, intra-day bidding has the lowest risk, since the winning broker can 
perform some hedging15 while the market is open. Pre-open bidding and post-closing 
                                                 
14 Bidding information is distributed to brokers when the market is open, and the agreed 
execution prices are the same day closing prices. The winning broker is identified when 
the equity market is open, but the winning broker will get names in a basket only after 
market is closed. This procedure was used by one of the managers in our sample before 
August 2003. In fact, this procedure is no longer popular among users of BPB. 
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bidding have very different types of risk. With pre-open bidding, a money manager has 
learned news and information since the previous day’s close. It is possible that a manager 
may package a basket in such a way to take advantage of the overnight news. For 
example, if there is news about a stock (in a basket) or a sector after the market closed the 
day before; the manager can decide whether to keep the stock (or stocks in that sector) in 
the basket depending on the expected price movement of the stock (or sector) due to the 
news. In this instance, competing brokers will charge more for their disadvantage due to 
the information asymmetry (the broker does not know the names in a basket16). Therefore 
pre-open bidding is also a proxy for information asymmetry risk. If it is a post-close 
bidding, it is more difficult for a manager to perform selective packaging. However, the 
winning broker cannot do much hedging against the basket he just won (because the 
market is closed). News can come out after the market closes, which may impact some 
stocks in the basket. Some brokers call this the overnight risk. In this case, the post-close 
biding is a proxy for inventory risk. We have conducted an informal survey with four 
major BPB brokers asking them the pricing difference between pre-open and post-close 
bidding. One broker responded that it does not matter. Another said that pre-open bidding 
is more expensive. The two remaining brokers said that post-closing bidding is more 
expensive. It is an empirical issue to investigate how the bidding procedure risk is priced. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 The winning broker does not know the names in a basket after the market closes. But 
he has enough sector level information to perform some sector level hedging. 
 
16 To mitigate this information asymmetry, most bidding procedures include a force 
majeure clause, which automatically eliminates individual names from a basket if a stock 
moves more than 5% (at the open) form the previous day’s close. Moreover, if the 
manager performs selective packaging regularly, brokers will learn about it. Brokers will 
increase their bid accordingly or not bid on a basket from this manager. 
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We used two proxies (dummy variables) for this determinant. If it is a pre-open bidding, 
the pre-open dummy variable is set to one and the post-close dummy is set to zero. If it is 
a post-close bidding, the pre-open dummy variable is set to zero and the post-close 
dummy is set to one. The estimated coefficients for these two dummy variables should be 
positive, but it is ambiguous which coefficient has a bigger value. We shall return to this 
discussion below. 
 
We have summarized the expected sign of estimated coefficients and risk category for 
each of the proxies or determinants in Table I. 
2.4. BPB data and basket characteristics 
By filtering through transaction records from two money managers17 who are known to 
trade BPB baskets regularly, we were able to extract 280 baskets during the period from 
August 2001 to September 2005. For each basket, we extracted the following data items: 
• Stock identifier (cusip or ticker) 
• Trade type – buy or sell 
• Number of shares traded for each stock in a basket 
• Date of trade / bidding 
• Bidding procedure (pre-open, post-close, intra-day) 
• Winning bid (cents / share) 
• Commission (cents / share, if any) 
                                                 
17 A consulting firm specialized in securities transactions provided the transaction records 
for one of the managers. We thank them for providing the data for this research project. 
Due to confidentiality, the name of the money managers and those of the winning brokers 
were excluded from the records before we received the data. We were able to obtain a 
second set of transaction records from another asset manager. We shall refer to these two 
managers as manager A and manager B. 
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With this set of basket data and other data sources (e.g., Barra sector classification, 
closing prices, trading volume), we were able to construct all determinants and proxies as 
described in Section 2.3. 
 
There are few differences between our sample and the one used by Kavajecz and Keim 
(2005). First, there is no overlap in terms of time span. In their study, data is from July 
1998 to July 2000. In our study, data is from August 2001 to September 2005. Second, all 
baskets used pre-open biding in their study. In our sample, there are three different 
bidding procedures. Manager A used only pre-open bidding. Manager B used both pre-
open and post-close bidding from August 2003 to September 2005. Before August 2003, 
manager B used intra-day bidding. Third, the mean market capitalization of the stocks in 
a basket is more than $10 billion in their study, which implies that these are large-cap 
baskets. In our sample, there are 31 small-cap baskets. Fourth, the sample size of our 
study is larger (280 vs 83). However, there are some data items we do not have. First, we 
have data only for baskets that are awarded to winning brokers, and not for baskets that 
are passed over by the manager (i.e., baskets not awarded to any broker after bidding). 
Second, we do not have data on bids submitted by all competing brokers. We have data 
only on the winning bids. Table II provides some summary statistics for the basket data 
used in our study.  
 
By comparing data summary statistics from Kavajecz and Keim (2005) with our full 
sample shown in Table II, we note the following observations. First, baskets in our 
sample tend to be bigger in terms of the: 
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number of stocks being traded in a basket (231 vs 163), 
total trade size (329 million vs 89 million), and 
mean shares traded per stock (53,781 shares vs 20,651 shares). 
Second, stocks traded in our sample have a larger market capitalization than that of 
Kavajecz and Keim (2005) ($18 billion vs $13 billion). Third, our baskets may be slightly 
easier to trade. The mean of percentage of ADV is 7.87% vs 10.81%. Fourth, there are 
three basket characteristics that are very similar: 
percentage of names are NASDAQ stocks (23.01% vs 23.30%), 
mean price inverse of stocks in a basket (0.0402 vs 0.0379), 
percentage of stocks that are buys (45.59% vs 50.80%). 
In summary, there is no significant difference in basket characteristics between our 
sample and that used by Kavajecz and Keim (2005) except for the time span of our 
sample. 
2.5. Result and analysis 
We conducted our analysis by running different regressions using various combinations 
of determinants and proxies discussed in Section 2.3. We also tested the five 
determinants suggested by Kavajecz and Keim (2005). Table III summarizes the results 
of these regressions. The first row of the table identifies the different version of 
regression. The first column on the left contains the determinants (or proxies of the 
determinants). Each table cell contains three numbers: the top number is the estimated 
coefficient. The middle number is the T-statistic. The bottom number is the p-value. 
2.5.1. Testing the pricing determinants suggested by Kavajecz and Keim 
(Regression #1) 
Kavajecz and Keim (2005) suggested the following five determinants in their study: 
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1. Number of stocks (names) in a basket, 
2. Mean number of shares traded per stock in a basket, 
3. Skewness of the distribution of percentage of ADV18 for stocks in a basket, 
4. Percentage of stocks in a basket that trade on NASDAQ, 
5. Mean of the ratio (
Price
1  ) for stocks in a basket. 
We tested these determinants using our data, and the results are shown as regression #1 in 
Table III. There are some differences between our results and the one reported by 
Kavajecz and Keim (2005). First, the adjusted R-sq for their determinants is much 
smaller in our sample. The adjusted R-sq in their paper is 72.1% (Kavajecz and Keim 
(2005), p.476). The adjusted R-sq in our sample is 41.16%. The sign of the estimated 
coefficients for four of the determinants is consistent with Kavajecz and Keim (2005)’s 
prediction and statistically significant. However, for skewness of the distribution of 
percentage of ADV for stocks in a basket, it has a negative sign rather than a positive sign 
suggested by Kavajecz and Keim (2005). On the other hand, this determinant is not 
significant in this sample. 
2.5.2. Determinants based on broker’s behavior (Regression #2) 
As discussed in Section 2.3, we have proposed a set of determinants based on how a 
broker perceives his various risk exposures. The performance of these determinants is 
shown as regression #2 in table III. Adjusted R-sq is comparable to the one reported by 
Kavajecz and Keim (2005) (71.48% vs 72.1%). The sign of all estimated coefficients 
matches with our prediction shown in Table I. The only exception is the post-close 
                                                 
18 Kavajecz and Keim (2005) use the term VolRatio for “percentage of ADV” in their 
paper. 
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dummy. All estimated coefficients are significant with three exceptions: earnings 
announcement dummy, high percentage of ADV concentration 1, and post-close bidding 
dummy. It is not surprising that the earnings announcement dummy only gets a 
marginally significant t-statistic. It is because this proxy (for the earnings announcement) 
is defined in a simple and primitive way. The proxy of high percentage of ADV 
concentration 1 also records a marginally significant t-statistic. This may indicate that 
BPB brokers may have higher risk tolerance than we expect. However, based on our 
discussion with BPB brokers, many mentioned that they would be “very concerned” if 
they saw stocks in a basket that traded more than 50% of ADV. On the one hand, the 
estimated coefficient for the post-close dummy has the wrong sign; on the other hand, the 
t-statistic for the estimation is also small. In Section 2.3.2.3, we predict that the estimated 
coefficient for Concentration 3 > coefficient for Concentration 2 > coefficient for 
Concentration 1. Empirical results support this prediction. The coefficient for 
Concentration 3, Concentration 2, and Concentration 1 are 193.03, 128.75, and 35.19, 
respectively. Overall, our set of determinants performs quite well in explaining the 
pricing of BPB. 
2.5.3. A hybrid model (Regression #3) 
To test the relative performance of these two sets of pricing determinants, we ran a 
regression using both determinants from Kavajecz and Keim (2005) and those suggested 
by us. The result is shown as regression #3 in Table III. Adjusted R-sq is now 73.22%, 
which is only a slight improvement when compared with regression #2 (71.48%). There 
are some interesting observations regarding the performance of Kavajecz and Keim 
(2005)’s pricing determinants and our proposed determinants. The significance for 
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skewness of percentage of ADV increases, but it still has a negative sign. The 
significance for the other four Kavajecz and Keim (2005) determinants is all reduced 
relative to regression #1. The only Kavajecz and Keim (2005)’s determinant that remains 
statistically significant is the percentage of stocks that are listed in NASDAQ. For our 
suggested determinants, those that are significant in regression #2 continue to be 
significant. Surprisingly, the significance for earnings announcements, and high 
percentage of ADV concentration 1, improves slightly. 
2.5.4. A hybrid model (Regression #4) 
We built another hybrid model by including only some of the determinants suggested by 
Kavajecz and Keim (2005) and dropping two of their determinants: (1) skewness of 
percentage of ADV and (2) number of stocks in a basket, due to their weak performance. 
The result of this hybrid model is shown as regression #4 in Table III. The coefficients 
for (1) Mean shares traded per stock and (2) Mean price inverse of stocks in a basket are 
only marginally significant. 
2.5.5. A hybrid model (Regression #5) 
For reference, we also provided the result for a hybrid model that includes only one 
determinant, the percentage of stocks that are listed in NASDAQ, from Kavajecz and 
Keim (2005)’s model. The result is shown as regression #5 in Table III. The result is very 
similar to that of regression #2 though slightly better (Adjusted R-sq: 72.68 vs 71.48). In 
summary, determinants proposed in this paper continue to do well in all hybrid models. 
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2.5.6. Pricing of BPB basket and option premium (Regression #6) 
We also explored the idea of applying option pricing theory to the pricing of a BPB 
basket19. Our hypothesis is that the pricing of BPB basket is positively correlated with 
BPB broker’s hedging cost. It is because the hedging cost is a BPB broker’s overhead 
while providing liquidity service to a manager. One way to model or measure a BPB 
broker’s hedging cost is by the premium of at-the-money option. Imagine a BPB broker 
buys a put option for each sell20 transaction in a basket. The strike price and stock price in 
the put option premium calculation are both set to the closing price used for executing the 
BPB basket. Basically, a BPB broker buys an at-the-money option that protects him from 
any potential loss if the stock price goes down. Similarly, the BPB broker can use at-the-
money call option to hedge each buy transaction in a BPB basket. These call options 
protects the BPB broker from any potential loss if the stock price goes up. We do not 
imply that a BPB broker really buys these options for his hedging purpose. However, the 
cost of buying these options provides a convenient and analytical way to measure a BPB 
broker’s hedging cost.21 We used the Black-Scholes formula to calculate the call (or put) 
option premium for each stock in a BPB basket. We make one more assumption in the 
option premium calculation. We assume that the time to expiration is four trading days22. 
It is the time a BPB broker needs to unload all the stocks in a BPB basket. 
                                                 
19 Copeland and Galai (1983) model bid and ask as call and put options provided by a 
dealer. However, our argument is different from theirs. We use option price as a measure 
of BPB broker’s hedging cost. 
 
20 If a manager sells a stock in a basket then the winning BPB will have a long position 
for that stock.  He needs a put option to hedge against decreasing stock price. 
 
21 Bollen et al. (2004) use similar hedging cost argument for modeling a dealer’s spread. 
 
22 It is based on our discussion with several BPB brokers. 
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To test our hypothesis, we included the price of these at-the-money options as a new 
independent variable. The result is shown as regression #6 in table III. The estimated 
coefficient for this new independent variable is positive (0.17) and statistically 
significant. The result is also consistent with our expectation. This indicates that further 
research in studying potential application of option theory in BPB pricing might be 
fruitful. Chapter 3 will further explore this insight. 
2.6. Conclusion 
By modeling how BPB brokers perceive various risk exposures, we are able to improve 
and extend the BPB pricing determinants identified by Kavajecz and Keim (2005). Our 
larger data set enables us to investigate the effect of trading small-cap baskets. Moreover, 
by having data on BPB baskets that are executed using different bidding procedures, we 
are able to test the difference in pricing among bidding procedures. We also show that 
market-wide liquidity and earnings announcements can impact the pricing of BPB. In 
other words, BPB pricing determinants are not necessary limited to the trading 
characteristics of a basket. Other factors, for example, market-wide liquidity, can 
potentially impact the pricing of BPB. Our analysis shows that the newly proposed 
pricing determinants perform better than those initially identified by Kavajecz and Keim 
(2005), at least in this sample. We also conducted a preliminary test on applying option 
pricing methodology in the context of pricing BPB. Furthermore, our results provide 
evidence that there might be a possible link between option pricing and BPB pricing. 
Chapter 3 explores this linkage further.    
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Table I 
Summary of the expected sign of estimated coefficients in regression analysis 
The dependent variable in the regression analysis is the winning bid of a BPB basket. The 
independent variables are listed below under BPB Pricing Determinants. These 
determinants are based on various risk exposures perceived by a BPB broker. The 
expected sign of estimated coefficients is listed in the second column. The third column 
notes the risk category (i.e., inventory risk and information asymmetry risk) for 
corresponding determinants. 
 
BPB broker 
Risk 
Category 
BPB Pricing Determinants Expected 
Sign 
Market 
Microstructure 
Risk Category 
Market 
liquidity risk 
Market liquidity Negative Inventory 
Basket lumpiness Positive Information 
Asymmetry 
 
Idiosyncratic 
stock risk Earning announcement season  Positive Information 
Asymmetry 
Percentage of ADV from the top 3 
prominent trades 
Positive Inventory and /or  
Information 
Asymmetry 
Small-cap trade Positive Inventory 
Sector Imbalance Positive Information 
Asymmetry 
High percentage of ADV 
concentration 1 
Positive Inventory and /or  
Information 
Asymmetry 
High percentage of ADV 
concentration 2 
Positive Inventory and /or  
Information 
Asymmetry 
 
 
 
 
 
Basket 
characteristics 
Risk 
High percentage of ADV 
concentration 3 
Positive Inventory and /or  
Information 
Asymmetry 
Pre-open bidding Positive Information 
Asymmetry 
Bidding 
procedure 
Risk Post-close bidding Positive Inventory 
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Table II 
BPB Basket data summary statistics 
The total number of baskets is 280. The time period is from August 2001 to September 
2005. An item with an asterisk is determinant identified by Kavajecz and Keim (2005). 
We include these items for comparison purposes. For items with two rows of data, the 
bottom numbers are from Table 2 Panel A of Kavajecz and Keim (2005), which are the 
characteristics of completed basket in their study. (note: summary statistics are not 
available for Skewness of percentages of ADV in Kavajecz and Keim (2005)) 
 
Data Items /  
proxy /  
determinants 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Min 25th Med 75th Max 
Number of stocks in a 
basket* 
231 
163 
117 
101 
41 
30 
121 
82 
242 
129 
320 
243 
609 
396 
Total trade size 
($ million)  
328.57
88.97 
225.49 
73.33 
20.89 
16.36 
150.48
39.03 
285.77 
58.08 
455.77 
122.36 
1,188.14
323.25 
Total number of 
shares  
(shares in million) 
11.70 7.87 0.60 5.32 10.10 17.04 45.06 
% of stock  
that are buys 
45.59 
50.80 
9.57 
14.00 
13.14 
15.80 
40.13 
44.10 
46.19 
50.00 
50.85 
53.30 
100 
100 
Winning bids  
(basis point) 
48.90 36.47 7.94 21.67 34.15 67.29 186.64 
Mean of % of ADV  
for stocks in a basket 
7.87 
10.81 
7.64 
6.24 
0.60 
1.00 
2.54 
5.66 
5.04 
10.40 
11.84 
14.36 
64.09 
26.69 
Mean market cap  
($ million) of stocks  
in a basket 
17,817
13,359
9,287 
11,275 
502 
1,403 
11,303
6,086 
18,200 
9,584 
25.039 
13,065 
41,677 
40,443 
Mean shares traded  
per stocks* 
53,781
20,651
30,917 
12,910 
9,592 
3,289 
31,510
11,743
47,072 
18,526 
70,239 
27,690 
228,201 
66,655 
Skewness of  
% of ADV* 
4.84 2.80 1.77 3.29 4.20 5.41 18.60 
% name of stocks  
that are NASDAQ* 
23.01 
23.3 
11.44 
7.6 
0.00 
6.8 
16.32 
19.1 
19.53 
24.2 
23.83 
28.2 
57.24 
37.4 
Mean price inverse  
of stocks in basket * 
0.0402
0.0379
0.0132 
0.0082 
0.0210
0.0205
0.0317
0.0327
0.0359 
0.0388 
0.0454 
0.0430 
0.1019 
0.0580 
Total trade weight in 
NASDAQ stocks (%) 
22.11 13.86 0.00 11.66 18.52 29.72 59.34 
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Market liquidity  
($ million) 
1,487 140 1,167 1,400 1,477 1,578 1,982 
Basket lumpiness  
(shares in million) 
2.03 1.38 0.19 1.05 1.70 2.55 7.34 
Earnings  
Announcement  
(dummy) 
0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 1 
Count of  
high % of ADV from  
top 3 prominent trades 
0.71 0.95 0 0 0 1 3 
Small-Cap trades   
(shares in million) 
0.55 0.74 0 0 0.01 0.09 14.57 
Sector Imbalance risk  
(%) 
13.34 9.27 2.04 6.71 10.28 18.47 51.10 
High % of ADV 
concentration 1 
0.03 0.05 0 0 0.01 0.04 0.39 
High % of ADV 
concentration 2 
0.02 0.04 0 0 0 0.01 0.39 
High % of ADV 
concentration 3 
0.01 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.22 
Pre-open dummy 0.62 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
Post-close dummy 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 31
Table III 
Regression result using various blind principal bid pricing determinants 
The dependent variable in the regression analysis is the winning bid of a basket. 
Independent variables are determinants listed in the first column. Regression #1 uses 
determinants identified by Kavajecz and Keim (2005). Regression #2 uses determinants 
suggested in this study based on various risk exposures perceived by a BPB broker. 
Regression #3, #4 and #5 are hybrid models that combine determinants from Kavajecz 
and Keim (2005) and those suggested by our analysis. Regression #6 shows the use of 
option pricing theory in blind principal bid pricing. Each cell in the table contains three 
numbers: the top number is the estimated coefficient; the middle number is the t-statistic; 
the bottom number is the p-value. 
 
Regression #  
Determinants 1 2 3 
Number of stocks in a basket* -0.14 
-7.81 
<0.0001
 -0.02 
-0.91 
0.3662 
Mean shares traded per stocks* 0.0004 
6.69 
<0.0001
 0.000083
1.10 
0.2706 
Skewness of % of ADV* -0.41 
-0.67 
0.5031 
 -0.84 
-1.91 
0.0577 
% of stocks that are NASDAQ* 197.76 
9.87 
<0.0001
 59.11 
3.16 
0.0017 
Mean price inverse of stocks in basket (%)* 521.27 
2.85 
0.0047 
 255.56 
1.56 
0.1193 
Market liquidity  -0.03 
-3.02 
0.0028 
-0.03 
-3.43 
0.0007 
Basket lumpiness (10-6)  4.69 
4.20 
<0.0001 
4.04 
2.22 
0.0272 
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Earning Announcement (dummy)  3.39 
1.19 
0.2352 
4.86 
1.73 
0.0853 
Count of high % of ADV from top 3 prominent trades  7.17 
3.63 
0.0003 
7.00 
3.61 
0.0004 
Small-cap trades (10-6)  12.62 
14.23 
<0.0001 
9.14 
7.39 
<0.0001 
Sector Imbalance  44.54 
2.56 
0.0112 
53.46 
2.65 
0.0086 
High % of ADV concentration 1  35.10 
1.02 
0.3100 
39.34 
1.17 
0.2419 
High % of ADV concentration 2  128.75 
3.83 
0.0002 
134.32 
4.06 
<0.0001 
High % of ADV concentration 3  193.03 
4.26 
<0.0001 
196.97 
4.35 
<0.0001 
Pre-open dummy  15.38 
5.15 
<0.0001 
13.41 
3.68 
0.0003 
Post-close dummy  -4.47 
-0.85 
0.3985 
1.51 
0.27 
0.7892 
option price    
Intercept -5.32 
-0.68 
0.4960 
47.86 
3.55 
0.0004 
34.81 
2.23 
0.0266 
N 280 280 280 
Adj R-sq  (%) 41.16 71.48 73.22 
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Table III (continued) 
Regression result using various blind principal bid pricing determinants 
Regression #  
Determinants 4 5 6 
Number of stocks in a basket*    
Mean shares traded per stocks* 0.000106 
1.43 
0.1534 
  
Skewness of % of ADV*    
% of stocks that are NASDAQ* 51.61 
2.91 
0.0039 
57.82 
3.58 
0.0004 
30.19 
1.78 
0.0766 
Mean price inverse of stocks in basket (%)* 232.58 
1.42 
0.1577 
  
Market liquidity -0.03 
-3.47 
0.0006 
-0.03 
-3.43 
0.0007 
-004 
-3.97 
<0.0001
Basket lumpiness (10-6) 3.26 
1.87 
0.0626 
5.09 
4.63 
<0.0001 
5.52 
5.15 
<0.0001
Earning Announcement (dummy) 3.93 
1.41 
0.1606 
4.11 
1.47 
0.1435 
4.43 
1.63 
0.1041 
Count of high % of ADV from top 3 prominent trades 7.39 
3.81 
0.0002 
7.32 
3.79 
0.0002 
8.00 
4.25 
<0.0001
Small-cap trades (10-6) 9.30 
7.53 
<0.0001 
9.92 
8.63 
<0.0001 
9.58 
8.56 
<0.0001
Sector Imbalance 63.17 
3.58 
0.0004 
57.46 
3.30 
0.0011 
62.16 
3.67 
0.0003 
High % of ADV concentration 1 37.61 
1.12 
0.2648 
37.23 
1.10 
0.2713 
21.25 
0.64 
0.5202 
High % of ADV concentration 2 136.94 
4.16 
<0.0001 
133.92 
4.06 
<0.0001 
130.51 
4.08 
<0.0001
High % of ADV concentration 3 185.92 
4.14 
<0.0001 
198.91 
4.48 
<0.0001 
189.52 
4.39 
<0.0001
Pre-open dummy 13.85 
3.88 
12.26 
4.02 
22.36 
5.86 
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0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Post-close dummy 0.06 
0.01 
0.9916 
-3.73 
-0.72 
0.4716 
8.48 
1.46 
0.1453 
option price   0.17 
4.19 
<0.0001
Intercept 29.12 
1.90 
0.0586 
39.67 
2.97 
0.0033 
11.81 
0.81 
0.4185 
N 280 280 280 
Adj R-sq  (%) 72.88 72.68 74.28 
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Chapter 3 
Two Theoretical Models for Blind Principal Bid Basket 
Trading Cost 
3.1. Introduction 
The market microstructure models for a stock dealer’s23 spread in a quote-driven market 
are based on trading a single stock. In this chapter, we estimate two different structural 
models for a liquidity provider’s spread when trading a basket of stocks simultaneously 
and immediately using a market mechanism called blind principal bid (BPB).24 The 
spread is a liquidity demander’s cost for immediacy. Two previous studies by Kavajecz 
and Keim (2005) and Chapter 2 of this dissertation investigate a similar question. Neither 
study, however, is based on any structural models. A considerable body of market 
microstructure research has attempted explicitly to model a dealer’s spread for trading a 
single stock in a quote-driven market. In this chapter we apply two structural spread 
models, developed by Stoll (1978a, 1978b) and Bollen, Smith, and Whaley (2004), 
respectively, in the context of trading a basket of stocks simultaneously. Whereas they 
use trade data on an individual stock, our model estimation is done using data on trading 
a basket of stocks simultaneously. This is one of the most important features of this 
study. Our data come from two active equity asset managers who trade stock baskets and 
regularly use BPB. The liquidity providers, typically major sell-side firms, are 
                                                 
23 We use the term dealer and market maker interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
 
24 For the remainder of this chapter, we use BPB as the abbreviation for blind principal 
bid. The institutional description of BPB can be found in chapter 1. 
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customarily called blind principal bid brokers. BPB brokers commit their own capital to 
provide liquidity by being the counter party for each of the trades within a basket of 
stocks.  
 
The motivation for this study is based on our observation that the role and function of a 
BPB broker is very similar to that of a dealer in a quote-driven market, especially with 
respect to the risk exposure faced by a dealer.25 Both dealers and BPB brokers facilitate 
trading by providing immediate liquidity using their own capital. Their capital is exposed 
to certain risks while providing a liquidity service (e.g., adverse price movement or the 
other party is informed). Therefore, they will certainly request compensation for their risk 
exposure: for dealers, in the form of a spread; for BPB brokers, a fee (or trading cost26) 
paid by an asset manager. Our hypothesis involves using the two dealer’s spread models 
mentioned above, subject to some minor extensions, to model the trading cost paid by 
users of BPB. Our insight is that a BPB broker’s fee and a dealer’s spread are 
conceptually equivalent. We found that both extended models perform quite well, 
explaining a liquidity provider’s spread for trading a basket of stocks. Using Bollen, 
Smith, and Whaley’s (2004) methodology, we are able to decompose the spread into 
various fundamental and structural cost components and rank their relative magnitude. 
The inventory-holding costs are found to be the largest cost component. We empirically 
                                                 
25 The term “blind principal bid dealers” (rather than “blind principal bid brokers”) may 
be a better term for this type of liquidity providers, since their roles and functions are 
similar to a dealer (who bears risk) in a quote-driven market. Strictly speaking, a broker 
does not face the same risk as a dealer. Nevertheless, we shall continue to use the 
industry norm, blind principal broker, for the remainder of the chapter. 
  
26 In Chapter 1, we refer to this type of trading cost as a “liquidity risk premium.” 
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deduce an implied trading rate used by a liquidity provider to unload shares in a basket 
after accepting a basket. For trades within a basket, we also analyze an empirical relation 
between informed trades and their (dollar) trade size (expressed in percentage of average 
daily dollar volume). One of the potential applications of this study is to help asset 
managers develop a benchmark trading cost when trading a basket of stocks using blind 
principal bids.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature 
on modeling spread and the various components of a spread. Section 3.3 describes the 
basket trading data used in this study. Section 3.4 and 3.5 describe how we estimate 
Stoll’s (1978a, 1978b) model and Bollen, Smith, and Whaley’s (2004) model, 
respectively. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2. Literature Review 
Since Garman (1976) coined the term “market microstructure,” there has been an 
explosive growth of research in this field. This section provides a very brief overview of 
various research topics relevant to this paper.27  
 
One early approach to modeling a dealer’s spread was to tackle the problem as an 
inventory management problem from the dealer perspective. This approach is commonly 
referred as the inventory model in the market microstructure literature (e.g. O’Hara 
(1997)). Several studies take this approach. Garman (1976) models the spread as an 
                                                 
27 Several excellent survey papers and books offer a more detailed and comprehensive 
treatment; see, for example, Coughenour and Shastri (1999), Madhavan (2000), Stoll 
(2003), Biais et al. (2005), O’Hara (1997), and Hasbrouck (2006). 
 38
optimization problem in which the dealer chooses an optimal bid and ask price. The 
broker sets bid and ask prices only once at the beginning of time. The objective function 
is to maximize the dealer’s expected profit while taking into consideration the problem of 
running out of cash or inventory and when the arrival of trade orders is stochastic. Stoll 
(1978a) also solved the inventory management problem as an optimization problem, but 
models the compensation for a dealer who holds a sub-optimal portfolio while providing 
liquidity. Holding sub-optimal portfolio means extra risk exposure that generates a 
dealer’s compensation. Stoll (1978a, 1978b) also analyzes various fundamental cost 
components in a dealer’s spread. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) began with framework 
similar to that of Garman (1976), but allow bid and ask prices to change when inventory 
changes. Ho and Stoll (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981), and Ho and Stoll (1983) are 
extensions and enhancement to Stoll (1978a). O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) tried to 
address some of the restrictions in Ho and Stoll’s (1981) model, for example, by 
employing an infinite time horizon rather than the finite time horizon in Ho and Stoll 
(1981). 
 
There are several empirical studies as well. Stoll (1978b) is the empirical test for Stoll 
(1978a). Ho and Macris (1984) use transaction prices and dealer inventory of some 
American Stock Exchange options and find some empirical evidence supporting Ho and 
Stoll (1981). They show that dealers’ spread is positively correlated to asset risk and 
dealers adjust their quotes in response to their inventory position. Hasbrouck and 
Sofianos (1993) find that dealers have a preferred level inventory, adjusting the bid and 
ask prices to bring inventory to a preferred level. Hansch et al. (1998) conduct direct tests 
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of Ho and Stoll’s (1983) inventory model using London Stock Exchange data. One of 
their findings is that relative inventory position is significantly related to the ability to 
execute large trades, which supports the inventory model of dealer’s spread. Naik and 
Yadav (2003) test Ho and Stoll’s inventory model and also investigate a particular 
question where dealer firms manage inventory on a stock-by-stock or portfolio basis. 
They find that individual dealers manages their own inventory but do not focus on the 
overall inventory of their firms.  
 
Another approach to model a dealer’s spread is from an information asymmetry 
perspective, based on adverse selection theory. This class of models takes into 
consideration that a dealer may be disadvantaged when trading with an informed trader. 
Some of the literature, e.g. O’Hara (1997), refers to this as the information asymmetry 
model. Bagehot (1971) is thought to be the first study of this information asymmetry. 
Copeland and Galai (1983) model a dealer’s spread as maximum expected profit, 
balancing losses from trading with informed traders and gains from trading with 
uninformed (liquidity) traders. Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) model incorporates an 
additional element not included in Copeland and Galai’s model, namely, that informed 
traders’ trades have information content. Even a dealer cannot distinguish an informed 
from an uninformed trader; a dealer alters his expectation of a stock’s true price 
conditional on the trades he receives. Easley and O’Hara’s (1987) model differs from 
Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) model in one major aspect: they explicitly consider the 
effect of trade size executed by traders on stock prices, motivated by empirical 
observation that large trades are executed at worse prices. 
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Since the spread can be modeled as a function of inventory holding and information 
asymmetry, researchers have investigated whether one can decompose the spread into 
these two components. A broader issue is the estimation of various components (e.g. 
order processing costs, inventory costs, and information asymmetry costs) that contribute 
to the bid-ask spread. Empirical studies along these lines include Roll (1984), Choi et al. 
(1988), Glosten and Harris (1988), Stoll (1989), George et al. (1991), Madhavan et al. 
(1997), and Huang and Stoll (1997). Huang and Stoll manage to generalize all these 
works. Coughenour and Shastri (1999) provide a concise survey of this topic, wherein 
most papers are based on time series analysis. There are, however, some studies that use a 
cross-sectional approach, for example, Stoll (1978b) and Bollen et al. (2004). Since time 
series data do not exist for a BPB basket, Stoll and Bollen et al.’s cross-sectional 
approach makes estimation of various trading cost components feasible for the BPB 
basket. We discuss these two studies in more detail in Section 3.4 and 3.5. 
 
Some literature also investigates the empirical evidence of the various determinants of a 
dealer’s spread. Demsetz (1986), Tinic (1972), Tinic and West (1972, 1974), Benston and 
Hagerman (1974) and Branch and Freed (1977). Bollen, Smith and Whaley et al. (2004) 
provide a concise summary and comparison of these studies. Two studies, Kavajecz and 
Keim (2005) and chapter 2 of this dissertation, are particularly relevant to this chapter. 
Both investigate the empirical determinants of BPB trading cost.  
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3.3. Historical BPB Data 
The following is a description of the BPB basket data used in this study. We have 
gathered 196 BPB baskets executed regularly by two active asset managers.28 These 
baskets were traded during the period from January 2002 to September 2005. The trading 
activities are quite evenly distributed throughout the sample period.29 Manager A uses 
only pre-open bidding, while Manager B uses both pre-open and post-close bidding. For 
each basket executed, we gathered the following data items. (Data items specific to 
Stoll’s (1978) model and Bollen, Smith, and Whaley’s (2004) model are discussed in the 
next two sections.) 
1. Stock identifier (CUSIP or ticker) for each name in a basket, 
2. Transaction type for each name (buy or sell) in a basket, 
3. Number of shares traded for each name in a basket, 
4. Execution price30 for each name in a basket, 
5. Lowest (winning) bid (cents per share). 
The BPB trading cost (in dollars) paid by the manager for trading a BPB basket can be 
computed as the total number of shares in a basket times the lowest bid (i.e. winning bid). 
In some cases, it is convenient to express the cost in basis points. It can be computed by 
                                                 
28 We would like to thank a consulting firm specializing in securities transactions for 
providing transaction records for one of its managers. Due to issues of confidentiality, the 
names of the money managers and the winning brokers were excluded from the records 
before we received the data. We obtained a second set of transaction records from 
another asset manager. We refer to these two managers, both of whom specialize in 
quantitative investment strategies, as Managers A and B. 
 
29 The trading frequency is about once a week. 
 
30 For pre-open bidding, the execution price is the previous day’s closing price. For post-
close bidding, the execution price is the same- day closing price. Please refer to chapter 1 
for more detail. 
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dividing the cost (in dollars) by the total dollar value of a basket. When a BPB trading 
cost is expressed in basis points, it is conceptually similar to the relative spread or 
percentage spread (i.e. Spread / Price) in the market microstructure literature. Table IV 
provides descriptive statistics of some basket characteristics. 
3.4. Estimating Stoll’s (1978a, 1978b) model 
In this section, we describe how to estimate Stoll’s (1978a, 1978b) model using the BPB 
basket trading data. Stoll (1978a) focuses on developing a theoretical model for the 
holding cost component in a dealer’s spread based on inventory modeling and, to a lesser 
extent, other cost components. Stoll (1978b) is the empirical counterpart of the structural 
model developed by Stoll (1978a). Moreover, Stoll (1978b) tried to estimate a structural 
model in which the spread consists of three cost components (holding cost, order cost, 
and information cost). As mentioned in the original paper, Stoll sought to “develop a 
more explicit and rigorous model of the individual dealer’s spread.” This point is again 
emphasized by Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004), who are concerned with the structural 
form of a spread model because many models are based on economic reasoning rather 
than formal mathematical modeling. This leads to the criticism of ad hoc model 
specification and variable selection. 
 
The original model is a spread model for a single stock name, but our description 
emphasizes the issues that are more relevant in the context of trading a basket of stocks 
simultaneously. Our model estimation basically follows the Stoll’s (1978b) approach. 
However, we have a slightly different model specification. In the original model, Stoll 
included a factor for competition (number of dealers). We cannot include this 
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competition factor in our model because we do not have data on the number of BPB 
brokers that were bidding on each basket. 
3.4.1. Model overview 
In the following we describe the dependent and independent variables in our cross-
sectional regression. As in Stoll’s original paper, the natural logarithms of the variables 
are used when conducting the regression. We also borrow the variable symbols from the 
original paper to facilitate the cross-reference between two papers. 
 
Basket trading cost (expressed in basis points31), si, is the dependent variable. In the 
original paper, si is the percentage spread. i is the BPB basket identifier (i.e. i = 1, 2, 
3,…., 196). All other variables given below are independent variables. 
 
Basket variance, σ2i. It is a direct measurement of the risk for a basket.32 The sign of the 
estimated coefficient for σ2i is expected to be positive. A BPB broker will charge more 
for a more risky basket.  
 
Basket weighted-average volume, Vi, is the weighted average of dollar volume for a 
basket. For each stock in a basket, we compute its average daily dollar trading volume 
during the last 10 trading days (before the date of basket bidding). The weight used in 
calculating Vi is the dollar value of a trade for a stock (within a BPB basket) divided by 
                                                 
31 The BPB trading cost = (cost per share × total number shares traded) / (total BPB 
basket dollar value traded ) 
 
32 The basket variance is estimated using the MSCI Barra U.S. risk model. 
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the total dollar value of a basket. Basket volume is used as a proxy for the holding period 
in Stoll’s model. The greater the volume, the shorter time (i.e. less risk) taken by a BPB 
broker to unload (or reverse) positions in a basket. The sign of the estimated coefficient 
for Vi is expected to be negative.  
 
Basket weighted-average turnover, (V /T)i. The turnover for each stock within a BPB 
basket is defined as the 10-day average dollar volume divided by its market 
capitalization.33 The weight used in calculating (V /T)i is the dollar value of a trade for a 
stock (within a basket) divided by the total dollar value of a basket. Basket turnover is 
used as a proxy for adverse selection in Stoll’s model. Based on Stoll’s original 
argument, if a trade is driven by liquidity need (i.e. it originated from an uninformed 
trader), the traded volume tends to be proportional to market capitalization. However, if a 
trade for a stock originates from an informed trader, volume tends to be out of proportion 
to the stock’s market capitalization. The sign of the estimated coefficient for turnover is 
expected to be positive. 
 
Basket weighted-average stock price, Pi, is a proxy for minimum cost in the original 
model. For each stock in a BPB basket, we gather the stock’s latest closing price (see the 
footnote for computing stock’s market capitalization). As with other variables, the weight 
used in calculating the basket weighted-average stock price is the dollar value of a trade 
for a stock (within a basket) divided by the total dollar value of a basket. Stoll argues that 
there is no prior expectation for the sign of the estimated coefficient.  
                                                 
33 Market capitalization is calculated based on the latest available closing price for a stock 
when basket bidding (auction) occurs. 
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In the original paper, Stoll also models the effect of dealer competition on the size of a 
spread. Due to the lack of data on the number of BPB brokers bidding for each historical 
basket, we do not include this particular independent variable in this study. Table V 
provides some descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation. 
3.4.2. Model estimation result and analysis 
Table VI summarized the result of estimating Stoll’s (1978b) model. Overall, Stoll’s 
model performs quite well to explain BPB basket trading cost. The R-square of the OLS 
regression is approximately 74%, which is similar to that of Kavajecz and Keim (2005) 
and chapter 2 of this dissertation. All estimated coefficients are highly significant with 
the exception of “basket weighted-average stock price.” In the original paper by Stoll 
(1978b), the stock price is used as a proxy for minimum cost. Since the estimated 
coefficient for basket weighted-average stock price is not significant, it may indicate that 
we need another proxy for minimum cost in the context of BPB basket trading. All the 
signs for the estimated coefficients are consistent with our expectation, as shown in 
Table V. 
 
A larger data sample that includes data from two different assets managers (rather than 
one manager, as in Kavajecz and Keim’s (2005) study), as well as a more parsimonious 
model specification than the one we studied in chapter 2, are not the only improvements 
in this chapter. A key feature that distinguishes this study from the two earlier studies is 
our use of a theoretical framework for the trading cost of a BPB basket and estimation of 
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the structural trading cost model. The structure of our model is not based on ad hoc 
economic reasoning, but is well defined.  
 
There is, however, one limitation when applying Stoll’s model directly in the context of a 
BPB basket trading. In Stoll’s original model, the inventory holding cost component 
reflects a single period model and the variance of a stock is assumed to be stationary 
during the period. This assumption may not be true when a BPB broker tries to unload a 
BPB basket. Our discussions with BPB brokers reveal that they usually unload stocks 
within a basket at different speeds. Therefore, the basket variance is unlikely to remain 
stationary during the period when a BPB broker is unloading stocks from a basket. Our 
second structural model can address this limitation.  
3.5. Estimating Bollen, Smith, and Whaley’s (2004) model 
In this section, we describe and estimate a spread model based on the methodology 
developed by Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004). As we have emphasized earlier, this 
spread model provides a theoretically grounded functional form of the relationship 
between the spread and its determinants. Their original model is for trading a single 
stock; a straightforward extension allows us to apply their model in the context of trading 
BPB baskets. An additional benefit is that this model can compute various components of 
a spread. Thus, we can compare the distribution of various cost components within a BPB 
basket spread with some other studies (which tend to analyze the cost categorization of a 
stock spread). A unique feature is that this model is one of the few that does not use time 
series data; as mentioned in the literature review, many previous studies do utilize time 
series data to estimate various cost components in a spread. Since there are no time series 
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data available for BPB baskets, Bollen, Smith and Whaley’s (2004) methodology 
becomes attractive in studying trading cost components for BPB baskets. To facilitate 
discussion of our study, we provide a very brief overview of Bollen, Smith, and Whaley 
(2004). Followings the model overview, we present our results on the model estimation 
and analysis. 
3.5.1. Model overview 
To minimize potential confusion and facilitate cross-reference between their paper and 
ours, we follow the terminology and original notation of Bollen, Smith and Whaley 
(2004). Moreover, the assumptions of their paper are directly applicable: (1) risk-free rate 
and dividend yield are ignored, and (2) the BPB broker has no existing inventory. Bollen, 
Smith and Whaley (2004) use the following functional form for a (stock) spread: 
SPRDi = f(OPCi, IHCi, ASCi, COMPi),   (3.1) 
where34  
i = identifier for a stock, 
OPCi = order-processing costs, 
IHCi = inventory-holding costs, 
ASCi = adverse selection costs, 
                                                 
34 The following are the descriptions for each cost component as given by Bollen, Smith 
and Whaley (2004). Order-processing costs are those directly associated with providing 
the market making service and include items such as the exchange seat, floor space rent, 
computer costs, informational service costs, labor costs, and the opportunity cost of the 
market maker’s time. Inventory-holding costs are those a market maker incurs while 
carrying positions acquired in supplying investors with liquidity. Adverse selection costs 
arise from the fact that market makers, in supplying immediacy, may trade with 
individuals who are better informed about the expected price movement of the underlying 
security. Degree of competition is likely to affect the level of the market maker’s bid/ask 
spread, particularly in an environment where barriers to entry are being slowly 
eliminated. 
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COMPi = degree of competition. 
As discussed in Section 3.4, Stoll (1978b) uses a similar functional form given by (3.1). 
For this paper, we are unable to model the effect of competition on the trading cost of 
BPB baskets due to a lack of competition data. We have argued that the cost faced by a 
dealer is very similar to that of a BPB broker; therefore, we adopt the following 
functional form for the cost of trading a BPB basket: 
(BPB basket trading Cost)i = f(OPCi, IHCi, ASCi),   (3.2) 
where 
i = identifier for each BPB basket in our data sample. 
Value inventory-holding premium using at-the-money option 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) argue that a dealer’s spread “needs to include a 
premium to cover expected inventory-holding costs, independent of whether the trade is 
initiated by an informed or uninformed customer.” In the context of a BPB basket, an 
analogous interpretation is that some trades within a BPB basket are liquidity-driven35 
and some others are information-driven.36 If a basket’s trades are purely liquidity-driven, 
(e.g. subscription or redemption of a S&P 500 index fund), the trade can be hedged easily 
using S&P 500 future contracts. A blind principal bid is unlikely to be used for this type 
of trading. Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) call this the inventory-holding premium 
(IHP). By using a European style at-the-money option to hedge stock price movement, 
they show that a dealer’s expected IHP is equal to the following: 
                                                 
35 One examples of a liquidity-driven trade is trades that trim back aggressive over-
weight or under-weight positions (relative to a manager’s benchmark) that are hitting the 
allowable upper or lower bound mandated by a portfolio owner. 
 
36 Since our data are from active asset managers, some of their trades are by definition 
supposed to be informed so that they can add value for their clients. 
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( )( )[ ]15.02)( −= tENSIHPE σ ,    (3.3) 
where 
S = true stock price, 
σ = standard deviation of security return, 
t = time until next offsetting order, 
N(·) = cumulative unit normal density function. 
Equation (3.3) is, in fact, the value of an at-the-money option based on the Black-Scholes 
formula (with the risk-free rate equal to zero). The strike price is equal to the true stock 
price. The intuition of Bollen, Smith and Whaley’s (2004) argument is that the value of 
the at-the-money option can be thought as the BPB broker’s hedging cost so that he is 
protected from adverse stock price movements while he is holding a basket in his 
inventory.37 
  
The following is an analogous interpretation of equation (3.3) in the context of trading 
BPB basket. S is the latest closing price38 for each stock in a BPB basket. From a BPB 
broker’s perspective, his profit or loss is calculated based on the closing prices. 
Therefore, closing price is the appropriate reference price for hedging purpose. σ is the 
standard deviation of rate of return for each stock in a basket. t is the time taken by a BPB 
broker to unload (a.k.a. unwind) a stock from a BPB basket. We introduce an extra 
variable that helps us model t. The new variable, unloading rate, g, is defined as the 
                                                 
37 Please refer to the original paper for a more formal and mathematical argument for 
valuing the inventory-holding premium. 
 
38 For pre-open bidding, the latest closing price is the previous business day closing price. 
For post-close bidding the latest closing price is the same-day closing price. 
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percentage of average daily (dollar) volume (ADV39) a BPB broker would like to trade 
(to unload a stock in a basket) during one trading day. For example, if average daily 
volume for a stock j (within a BPB basket) is $1,000,000 and if g = 25% of ADV per day, 
then a BPB plans to trade $250,000 worth of a stock each day to unload stock j. Further 
assume that the dollar trade size for stock j is $500,000. Hence, it will take the BPB 
broker about two days to unloaded stock j from a BPB basket. Therefore, we have the 
following relation between t and g:  
g
t
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
= medaily volu average sstock'
basket ain stock  afor  desizedollar tra
.   (3.4) 
So, it takes two days for the BPB broker to unload this particular stock from a BPB 
basket. For half of all the shares for stock j, he needs options that expire in one day. For 
the other half, he needs options that expire in two days. For simplicity, we use the 
following definition of t in computing IHP: 
g
t
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
×= medaily volu average sstock'
basket ain stock  afor  desizedollar tra
5.0 .  (3.5) 
By computing IHP stock by stock (rather than IHP for a BPB basket as a whole), we do 
not require the unloading process to be done in a proportionally manner, so that the dollar 
weight for each stock within a basket remains stationary. As mentioned in the previous 
section, Stoll (1978b) does have this implicit limitation in the case of trading BPB basket. 
Therefore, Bollen, Smith and Whaley’s (2004) methodology has an advantage in 
                                                 
39 For the rest of the paper, we use the abbreviation ADV to stand for average daily 
(dollar) volume.  
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modeling the BPB basket trading cost. In summary, the expected basket IHP is the 
summation of each stock’s IHP and for each stock its t is given by equation (3.5): 
( )( )[ ]15.02)( −= ∑ jjj tENSbasketIHPE σ ,    (3.6) 
where j = 1, 2, ... , number of stocks in a BPB basket. 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) have the following regression model specification for a 
dealer’s spread: 
SPRDi = α0 + α1InvTVi + α2MHIi + α3IHPi + εi,   (3.7) 
where 
InvTVi = inverse of trading volume = 1/number of shares traded, 
MHIi = modified Herfindahl index, 
IHPi = inventory-holding premium. 
As we mentioned in the preceding section, we do not have the necessary data to model 
competition among BPB brokers. It is unfortunate that we are forced to omit MHI in our 
BPB basket trading cost model specification. InvTVi is used to model order-processing 
cost. Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) argue that order-processing costs are largely 
fixed; hence, the order processing cost per shares goes down when share volume rises. 
However, the number of shares transacted in BPB baskets is much larger than that 
transacted by a dealer for a single stock.40 Therefore, we define InvTVi slightly 
differently and re-define InvTVi = 1 / sqrt(Total shares in a BPB basket). The following 
is a regression model specification for the BPB basket trading cost: 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = α0 + α1InvTVi + α2(Basket IHP)i + εi,  (3.8) 
                                                 
40 In Table 3 of Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004), the mean number of shares traded in a 
day for a stock is between 250,000 and 600,000 during three different sampling periods. 
However, the mean number shares traded for a BPB basket is about 11 million shares. 
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where 
i = identifier for each BPB basket in our data sample 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = fee (in dollars) paid by manager to BPB broker, 
InvTVi = 1 / sqrt(Total shares in a BPB basket), 
(Basket IHP)i = Basket IHP given by equation (3.6). 
 
However, in the case of a BPB basket, there are two dimensions for order-processing 
cost. The first dimension is the total number of shares traded in a basket. The second 
dimension is the number of names in a basket. Another possible alternative regression 
model specification for BPB basket trading cost is: 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = α0 + α1InvNumofNamesi  
+ α2(Basket IHP)i + εi,   (3.9) 
where 
InvNumofNamesi = 1 / Number of names being traded in a BPB basket. 
In the next section, we compare the estimation results for these two specifications 
(equation (3.8) and equation (3.9)). Since the number of shares and the number of names 
are positively correlated,41 we prefer not to include both proxies in a single model 
specification. Including both proxies may introduce multicollinearity. Moreover, we 
prefer a more parsimonious model.  
 
                                                 
41 In our data sample, the correlation between the two is 0.77. 
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Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) argue that α2 in equation 3.8 (or α2 in equation 3.9 or 
α3 in equation 3.7) should be equal to one.42 They also prove that the expected IHP 
defined in equation (3.3) is approximately linear in the square root of t. Therefore, by 
adjusting the value of g, the unloading rate variable, we are able to have the following 
regression model specification for the BPB basket trading cost: 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = α0 + α1InvTVi + (Basket IHP(g))i + εi.  (3.10) 
In summary, equation (3.10) is a regression model specification which uses an at-the-
money option to value inventory-holding premium. The coefficient of (Basket IHP(g))i is 
calibrated to be equal to one. The estimation results for this model specification are given 
in next section. There is also some special interpretation of α0. Bollen, Smith and Whaley 
(2004) argue that the intercept term represents the minimum tick size. In the case of 
trading a BPB basket, there is no minimum tick size. A BPB broker is free to submit any 
bid during a basket auction. Therefore, our prior is that α0 will not be significantly 
different from zero. 
 
Informed and uninformed trades in a BPB basket 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) also proposed the following interesting way of 
interpreting the inventory-holding premium. The major benefit and contribution of this 
interpretation is that it allows the decomposition of the inventory-holding premium into 
two components: (1) premium for uninformed trades and (2) premium for informed 
trades. 
IHP = IHPU + pI(IHPI – IHPU)    (3.11) 
                                                 
42 If we regard the IHP as hedging cost, there is no obvious reason for a BPB broker to 
over-hedge or under-hedge. 
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where 
IHPU = inventory-holding premium for uninformed trades, 
IHPI = inventory-holding premium for informed trades, 
pI = probability of an informed trade. 
Similar to Bollen, Smith and Whaley’s (2004) methodology, we use the following Black-
Scholes formula to compute the value of IHPU and IHPI when a name in a basket is a 
buy.43 Basically the value of IHPU and IHPI is equal to the value of two slightly different 
call options. 
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where 
j = 1, 2, 3, …. , number of stocks that are purchased in a BPB basket, 
k = U or I. U stands for uninformed trade and I stands for informed trade, 
σj = standard deviation of security return, 
tj = time for unloading a stock from a BPB basket, 
Xj = latest closing price for stock j + per share cost of BPB basket trading cost,44  
SU,j = latest closing price45 for stock j, 
                                                 
43Equation (3.12) is the IHP calculation for one share. To calculate the IHP for a stock’s 
trade within a basket, one needs to multiply equation (3.12) by the number of shares 
traded for that stock in a basket. 
 
44 During a BPB basket auction, competing BPB brokers usually submit their best bid in 
term of cents per share. Please refer to Section 3 for a numeric example. Conceptually, Xi 
can be viewed as the ask price quoted by a stock dealer in the case of a manager buying a 
single stock name. 
 
45 In the original argument in formulating IHPU, SU,I is the stock’s true price. However, in 
the context of BPB basket trading, a stock’s latest closing price is used to calculate a 
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SI,j = (1 + q) × Xj46 and q > 0,  
N(·) = cumulative unit normal density function. 
 
The following is a brief description of the intuition of IHPU,j and IHPI,j. First, consider a 
uninformed buy of stock j ordered by an asset manager (i.e. a BPB broker is shorting 
stock j and needs to hedge the upward price movement of stock j), which corresponds to 
IHPU,j. A manager buys stock j at price Xj. Since the trade is uninformed, we argue that 
the stock price will not significantly deviate from SU,j. IHPU,j is the value of a slightly 
out-of-money call option that provides to the BPB broker protection when the price of 
stock j goes above Xj. One can think of IHPU,j as a hedging cost. In the case of an 
uninformed trade, the BPB broker is likely to obtain a profit under the assumption that 
the price of stock j is very unlikely to rise above Xj. The premium for an informed buy is 
IHPI,j. Similarly, a manager buys stock j at price Xj. However, since the buy is informed, 
one can imagine the price of stock j jumping to SI,j, which is above Xj, right after a BPB 
broker wins a basket. Therefore, the BPB broker is going to incur a loss on this informed 
trade. One can imagine the hedging cost (IHPI,j) to be an in-the-money call option with 
strike price = Xj and stock price = SI,j. 
 
To calculate the IHPk,j for a stock in a BPB basket whose trade is a sell, IHPk,j is equal to 
the value of a put option where: 
                                                                                                                                                 
BPB’s profit and lost. Therefore, we assume the latest closing price as the stock’s true 
price. 
 
46 We do not know the real stock price in the case of an informed trade. Like Bollen et al. 
(2004), we assume that the true price is q percentage above Xi. 
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Xj = latest closing price - per share cost of BPB basket trading cost, 
SI,j = (1 - q) × Xj and q > 0. 
 
To calculate the IHPU or IHPI for a BPB basket, we sum up stock level IHPU and IHPI. 
Using Bollen, Smith and Whaley’s (2004) methodology, we have the following 
regression model specification to estimate the probability that a trade is informed: 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = 
 α0 + α1InvTVi + α2(Basket IHPU,i(g))i  
+ α3(Basket IHPI,i(g,q) - Basket IHPU,i(g) )i + εi,  (3.13) 
where  
g = unloading rate that we used in estimating the model given by equation (3.10), 
q = a factor that links SI,j and Xj47, 
α3 = probability of an informed trade. 
We chose a value of g such that the estimated coefficient for the Basket IHP(g) in 
equation (3.8) (or equation (3.9)) is equal to one. We need to make some empirical 
assumption about the value of q. It is because we do not know the true price of a stock (it 
is assumed only the informed know the true price). For the model given by equation 
(3.13) to make sense, the estimated value of α2 must not be significantly different from 
one and the value of α3 must not be outside the range between zero and one (since α3 is 
the estimated probability of an informed trade).  
 
                                                 
47 In Bollen, Smith and Whaley’s (2004) paper, they use symbol k and we use symbol q 
in this paper.  
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However, there is one consideration unique in the context of trading a BPB basket. It is 
very difficult to argue that every stock being traded in a basket is an informed trade. In 
terms of dollar trade size within a BPB basket, it is common that there are small trades 
that are uninformed (or at least that contribute relatively lower risk to the BPB brokers). 
This type of trade size distribution is often due to the fact that the trade list (i.e. a BPB 
basket) is generated by a portfolio optimizer.48 For example, if a manager’s portfolio is 
out of bounds for certain industry exposures then the optimizer tries to bring the 
exposures within a pre-specified lower or upper bound. We argue that IHPI is equal to 
IHPU for this type of trade. Otherwise, IHPI for a BPB basket is overstated. Therefore, we 
introduce a new parameter, c, called uninformed trade cutoff. This parameter is expressed 
in units of percentage of ADV. If the dollar trade size of a trade expressed as percentage 
of ADV is less than c, the IHPI is set equal to IHPU (i.e. these type of trades are assumed 
to be uninformed). Otherwise, IHPI is computed based on equation (3.12).  
 
We will use the following regression model specification for our empirical analysis: 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = 
 α0 + α1InvTVi + α2(Basket IHPU,i(g))i  
+ α3(Basket IHPI,i(g,q,c) - Basket IHPU,i(g) )i + εi,  (3.14) 
where 
c = uninformed trade cutoff. 
                                                 
48 A trade list generated by traditional fundamental active manager usually has a lower 
number of names and the distribution of the dollar trade size is more concentrated. 
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3.5.2. Model estimation result and analysis 
In this section, we discuss various estimation results of the Bollen, Smith and Whaley 
(2004) model using historical BPB basket trading data. 
 
3.5.2.1. Choosing the proxy for order-processing cost 
The first analysis is of the selection of proxy for order-processing cost. In the model 
overview, we suggested two possible proxies for order-processing cost: 
1. InvTVi = 1 / sqrt(Total shares in a BPB basket i), 
2. InvNumofNamesi = 1 / Number of names being traded in a BPB basket i. 
To begin with, we arbitrarily set the unloading rate variable, g, to 25% of average daily 
volume per day49 to calculate t (time taken to unload a stock from a basket) for each stock 
in a basket. We need t to compute the expected basket IHP. The estimation result for 
modeling the specification given by equation (3.8) and equation (3.9) is summarized in 
Panel A of Table VII. Panel B is a summary of descriptive statistics for the variables. 
Panel C is the correlation matrix. When taken separately, both proxy definitions perform 
quite well. Both have an expected positive sign and their estimated coefficients are 
significant. The estimation result when including both proxies in a single regression is 
shown at the bottom of Panel A. In this case, InvTVi becomes insignificant while 
                                                 
49 The value of g affects only the estimated coefficient of E(basket IHP). The two proxies 
for order-processing cost are independent of g. 
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InvNumofNamesi continues to be significant. Therefore, we use InvNumofNamesi as the 
proxy for the order-processing cost for the remainder of the analysis.50  
 
3.5.2.2. Calibrating the unloading rate (g) and IHP as at-the-money options 
The next step in our analysis is to calibrate the value of variable g, the unloading rate, for 
the regression model specification given by equation (3.15). This specification is based 
on equation (3.9) and the method of calibration is to choose a value of g such that the 
estimated coefficient α2 is one (or not significant different from one). 
(BPB basket trading cost)i =  
α0 + α1InvNumofNamesi + α2(Basket IHP(g))i + εi.  (3.15) 
Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) show that IHP varies in an approximately linear 
fashion as the square root of t varies. As for specification (2) in Panel A of Table VII 
shows, the estimated value of α2 is 0.9647, which is slightly lower than one. To make α2 
equal to one requires a reduction the expected value of Basket IHP(g) by reducing t or 
increasing g. Equation (3.5) shows that t and g are inversely related. By adjusting the 
value of g from 25% of ADV to 26.86% of ADV51, the estimated value of α2 is calibrated 
to one. Alternatively, we can estimate α2 together with other model parameters (rather 
than assuming that α2 is equal to one) then the value of α2 can tell us whether the BPB 
brokers are over / under hedged. Unfortunately, one cannot separately identify α and g in 
                                                 
50 Analysis results using InvTVi as order-processing cost proxy are also available from us. 
We do not report these results here because InvNumofNamesi continues to perform better 
in all other analysis.  
51 Since 26.86 = 25/(0.9647 × 0.9647) 
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the model.52 Therefore, we continue to assume that α2 is equal to one. Table VIII shows 
the estimation result of equation (3.15). There is an empirical interpretation of g. The 
sample data implies that the BPB broker is unloading shares (of a stock) at a rate about 
27% of ADV per day. If a dollar trade size of a stock in a BPB basket is less than 27% of 
ADV, the BPB broker will finish unloading that particular stock in the first day of trading 
after winning a BPB basket. Similar, if the trade size is 100% of ADV, BPB broker is 
going to take more than four days to unload the stock. 
 
As Table VIII shows, the estimated value of α2 is 0.9999 and is highly significant. The 
estimated coefficient for InvNumofNames, α1, is positive and significant. These 
observations are consistent with our prior as described earlier. The R2 of this regression is 
74.91% and is comparable to that reported by Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004).53 
                                                 
52 As we have discussed earlier, the Basket IHP(g) can be computed as 
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53 R2 reported by them ranges from about 50% to 80% during three different sample time 
periods. 
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However, we have a significant negative intercept in our model estimation. We 
mentioned earlier that we expect the intercept not to be significantly different from zero. 
There are two possible explanations for a negative intercept. The first is that the IHP is 
overstated when IHP is valued as at-the-money options in equation (3.15). It is because 
these at-the-money options protect against unfavorable price movement (e.g. an asset 
manager sold a stock to a BPB broker and the price of the stock subsequently goes down) 
and a BPB broker can profit from favorable price movement. Bollen, Smith and Whaley 
(2004) argue that such profit is capped at a certain level due to competition. This 
explanation is testable if we compute IHP as an option collar. Based on option collar 
approach, the value of IHP is the value of an at-the-money option minus the value of a 
slightly out-of-money option.54 We report the test result for this explanation in the next 
section. The second possible explanation is that some of the trades within a basket are 
crossed with existing inventory carried by a BPB broker. IHP for crossed trades should 
be zero. Testing the second explanation is a more difficult task because data on BPB 
broker’s inventory are usually not publicly available.  
 
3.5.2.3. Inventory Holding Premium (IHP) as option collars  
Following is the test result related to explaining the negative intercept described above. 
When computing the out-of-money option, we assume the strike price is 0.5% away from 
                                                 
54 For a buy trade ordered by a manager, IHP = value of at-the-money call – value of 
slightly out-of-money put. In this case, IHP is modeled as buying a call and selling a put. 
Similarly, for a sell trade ordered by a manager, IHP = value of at-the-money put – value 
of slight out-of-money call. In this case, IHP is modeled as buying a put and selling a 
call. 
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the stock price.55 The model specification is also based on equation (3.15), but here the 
inventory-holding premium is modeled as an option collar. Table IX shows the 
estimation result. The estimated coefficients for InvNumofNames and Basket IHP are 
both positive and significant. The result continues to be consistent with our prior belief. 
However, the intercept is still significantly negative. Therefore, the negative intercept 
may be due to the internal-crossing between stocks in a basket and a BPB broker’s 
existing inventory. There appears, however, to be a weak point in this argument, as the R2 
of the regression is reduced. In summary, there is some weak evidence that the negative 
intercept might be attributed to internal crossing. 
 
3.5.2.4. Probability of informed trades and distribution of various trading components 
As discussed in the earlier section on an overview of the model, it is possible to estimate 
the probability that a trade is an informed trade. In this case, the model we estimate is 
given by equation (3.16), which is modified from equation (3.14).  
(BPB basket trading cost)i = 
 α0 + α1InvNumofNamesi + α2(Basket IHPU,i(g))i  
+ α3(Basket IHPI,i(g,q,c) - Basket IHPU,i(g) )i + εi.  (3.16) 
When we estimate the model, we need to make some assumptions about the values of q 
and c. We assume q takes the following values: 0.5%, 1%, 2%, and 3%, while c takes the 
following values: 3% of ADV, 4% of ADV, and 5% of ADV. Table X gives the 
estimation results for twelve different combinations of q and c. Panels A, B, and C of 
Table X correspond to three different values of c. The four rows of the sub-table 
                                                 
55 The 0.5% is an arbitrary number. Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) also use 0.5% for 
calculating the value of the out-of-money option.  
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represent four different values of q in each panel. There are twelve sub-tables in total. 
The estimated result will only have economic (and mathematic) interpretations if both of 
the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. The estimated value of α2 is not significantly different from one. 
2. The estimated value of α3 is not significantly outside the range between zero and 
one. 
Many of our results are similar to those reported by Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004). 
The estimated values of α1, α2, and α3 are positive and significant. As q increases (i.e. 
going down a panel), the probability of informed trades (i.e. the estimated value of α3) 
decreases. When q changes, the R2 of the regression remains quite stable. This implies 
that the adverse selection component of the BPB basket trading cost appears to be 
relatively constant. The T-stat for α2 is always the highest and most significant. This 
implies that inventory-holding cost is the most significant component of the trading cost. 
 
However, there are some results that differ from those of Bollen, Smith and Whaley 
(2004). Using their argument, the intercept terms should not be significantly different 
from zero, because the intercept can be interpreted as minimum tick size. However, there 
is no such concept of minimum tick size in a BPB basket trading. Our result shows that 
the intercepts are not significantly different from zero in the usual statistical sense. 
However, the values of intercept are always negative. A possible explanation may be the 
possibility of internal crossing between trades in a basket and the existing inventory held 
by BPB broker. The lack of data on a broker’s inventory makes further investigation of 
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this explanation impossible. Due to a lack of data on BPB competition, we are unable to 
model the effect of competition among BPB brokers on the trading cost of BPB baskets. 
 
Several results are unique in this study. When q is between 0.5% and 3%, BPB brokers 
begin to assume that a trade is informed when it reaches 3% or 4% of ADV. When q 
increases, c tends to increase as well. Therefore, when a BPB broker assumes a manager 
is informed, the broker would expect that informed trades are those with higher 
percentage of ADV. For a manager with higher skill, the BPB broker expects informed 
trades are likely to be those with a higher percentage of ADV. Based on Panel A and B, 
we can compute an average distribution of various cost components for the BPB basket 
trading cost. The average percentage of trading cost attributed to inventory-holding cost 
is about 61%, to adverse-selection about 34%, and to order-processing cost is about 23%. 
We are unable to find any other studies that analyze the distribution of various cost 
components when trading a basket of stocks. Therefore, it is difficult to compare other 
results to ours. Alternatively, we may compare our cost distribution with the cost 
distribution for trading a single stock name. However, the cost distribution for trading a 
single stock varies significantly among different studies. Stoll (1989) reports order-
processing cost as the largest component (47%), followed by adverse-selection cost 
(43%) and inventory-holding (10%). Stoll’s (1989) ranking of various cost components is 
exactly the opposite of our findings. Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004) find that 
inventory-holding cost is the largest component, which corresponds to our results. But 
they find that adverse-selection cost is the smallest, which differs from our results. Huang 
and Stoll (1997) report that the biggest cost component is order-processing (62%) 
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followed by inventory-holding (29%). The smallest cost component is adverse-selection 
(9%). Their ranking is also different from ours.  
 
In an overall sense, inventory-holding cost and adverse-selection cost are more important 
in the case of trading a BPB basket. The rationale might be that a BPB broker commits 
relatively more capital than that in market-making for a single stock, and each BPB 
basket always has some informed trades. However, one might argue that the relative 
ranking of various cost components can change over time. For example, during a period 
of higher risk (i.e. in a market with higher cross-sectional dispersion), adverse selection 
cost may become the biggest cost component. We leave this question for further research.  
3.6. Conclusion 
In this study, we estimate two structural spread models for trading BPB baskets. We 
extend and improve upon the work done by both Kavajecz and Keim (2005) and chapter 
2 of this dissertation by providing a formal framework to model the trading cost of BPB 
baskets. This modeling involves using two spread models developed by Stoll (1978a and 
1978b) and Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2004). The main contribution of this study is the 
successful application of these models in estimating the cost of immediacy (i.e. spread) 
for trading a basket of stocks. We are also able to characterize some empirical behavior 
of BPB brokers. Based on our data sample, the unloading rate used by a BPB broker is 
about 27% of ADV. The more a broker thinks a manager’s trade is informed, the bigger 
the mis-pricing and the bigger the (dollar) size for that trade in terms of higher percentage 
of ADV. The largest cost component when trading a BPB basket is found to be 
inventory-holding cost, followed by adverse-selection cost and order-processing cost. We 
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also find some weak evidence that internal crossing used by the BPB broker who won a 
basket56 helps reduce the overall BPB basket trading cost. However, we cannot model 
this effect of internal crossing formally due to a lack of data. For the same reason, we 
cannot model the effect of competition on the trading cost of BPB baskets. These are 
potential future research. 
 
One possible application of this paper is to help asset managers establish a benchmark 
trading cost when trading BPB baskets. Managers can use this benchmark trading cost to 
judge the fairness of bids submitted by BPB brokers. 
                                                 
56 Based on our informal discussion with BPB brokers, the range of crossing can range 
from 0% and may up to 30% of a basket. 
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Table IV 
Descriptive statistics for some blind principal bid (BPB) basket characteristics 
There are 196 baskets used in this study. 
Basket 
Characteristics 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. 25th Median 75th Max. 
Number of names  
in a basket 
199 113 41 93 193 294 609
Total trade size 
($ million) 
333.99 239.56 20.09 146.20 268.09 487.05 1,188.14
Total number of 
shares (million) 
11.26 8.27 0.60 5.05 8.95 16.29 45.06
Names that are buys 
(%) 
45.59 9.34 13.14 40.06 46.24 50.73 100.00
Lowest bid  
(basis points) 
53.57 33.00 8.95 26.90 44.79 73.42 164.75
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Table V 
Descriptive statistics for the variables in Stoll’s (1978a, 1978b) model 
The following table lists the variables we used in estimating Stoll’s (1978a, 1978b) 
model. The table also summarizes the expected sign of the estimated coefficient for the 
independent variables. The sample size is 196. Following Stoll’s original approach, the 
natural logarithm version of all variables is used in the model estimation. The descriptive 
statistics are based on the natural logarithm version of the variables. si = Basket trading 
cost which is the dependent variable. σ2i = Basket variance. Vi = Basket weighted-average 
(dollar) volume. (V /T)i = Basket weighted-average turnover. Pi = Basket weighted-
average stock price. 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. 25th Median 75th Max. Expected  
Coefficient 
sign 
si -5.42 0.63 -7.02 -5.91 -5.41 -4.92 -4.11 Dep. Var. 
σ2i -4.34 0.86 -5.62 -5.02 -4.39 -3.85 -1.78 + 
Vi 18.40 0.90 16.04 18.20 18.48 19.04 20.02 - 
(V /T)i -6.45 0.88 -9.73 -7.02 -6.46 -5.80 -4.49 + 
Pi 3.37 0.21 2.94 3.58 3.68 3.82 4.17 Ambiguous 
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Table VI 
Stoll’s (1978a, 1978b) model estimation result 
The following table summarizes Stoll’s (1978a, 1978b) model estimation result. The 
sample size (N) is 196. Following Stoll’s original approach, a natural logarithm version 
of all variables is used in the model estimation. si = Basket trading cost, which is the 
dependent variable. σ2i = Basket variance. Vi = Basket weighted-average (dollar) volume. 
(V /T)i = Basket weighted-average turnover. Pi = Basket weighted-average stock price. 
 
 si σ2i Vi (V /T)i Pi intercept N R-sq 
Coefficient Dep. Var. 0.1347 -0.1660 0.4528 0.0565 0.9330 196 74.32
T-stat  4.49 -4.35 14.21 0.37 1.90  
p value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7140 0.0587  
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Table VII 
Proxy for order-processing cost in Bollen, Smith and Whaley’s (2004) framework. 
Table IV has three panels. Panel A summarizes the model estimation result for the three 
different model specifications given below. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of the 
variables. Panel C shows the correlation among variables. The unloading rate, g, is set at 
25% of ADV when calculating basket IHP. 
 
(1) (BPB basket trading cost)i = α0 + α1InvTVi + α2(Basket IHP)i + εi,  
(2) (BPB basket trading cost)i = α0 + α1InvNumofNamesi + α2(Basket IHP)i + εi, 
(3) (BPB basket trading cost)i = α0 + α1InvTVi + α2InvNumofNamesi + α3(Basket IHP)i + εi, 
 
where 
i = 1, 2, 3, …, sample size of traded BPB baskets (identifier for each BPB basket), 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = fee (in dollars) paid by manager to BPB broker, 
InvTVi = 1 / sqrt(Total shares (expressed in million of share) in a BPB basket i), 
InvNumofNamesi = 1 / Number of names being traded in a BPB basket i, 
(Basket IHP)i = ∑j Sj[2N(0.5σjE(√tj)) – 1], 
j = 1, 2, 3, …, number of stock names in BPB basket i, 
Sj = latest closing price for stock j, 
σj = standard deviation of return for stock j, 
tj = time taken to unload stock j from basket i which is a function of g, 
N(·) = cumulative unit normal density function. 
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Table VII (continued) 
Proxy for order-processing cost in Bollen, Smith and Whaley’s (2004) framework. 
Panel A – Regression Results 
 (BPB  
basket 
 trading 
cost)i 
InvTVi Inv 
Numof 
Namesi 
(Basket 
IHP)i 
intercept N R-sq 
Model estimation for specification (1) 
Coeff Dep. Var. 840,475.75 0.9789 -429,215.56 196 74.26
T-stat  1.97 20.51 -1.83  
p 
value 
 0.0499 0.0000 0.0683  
 
Model estimation for specification (2) 
Coeff Dep. Var. 41,081,072.62 0.9647 -389,989.57 196 74.91
T-stat  3.01 23.55 -2.45  
p 
value 
 0.0030 0.0000 0.0152  
 
Model estimation for specification (3) 
Coeff Dep. Var. -300,690.52 48,528,485.53 0.9528 -308,924.29 196 74.94
T-stat  -0.46 2.29 19.62 -1.30 
p 
value 
 0.6451 0.0229 0.0000 0.1947 
 
Panel B – Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean St. Dev. Min. 25% Median 75% Max. 
(BPB  
basket  
trading  
cost)i 
1,672,477 1,857,896 45,777 608,587 1,217,757 2,060,929 15,557,582
InvTVi 0.3835 0.1931 0.1490 0.2478 0.3835 0.4448 1.2890
Inv 
Numof 
Namesi 
0.0075 0.0052 0.0016 0.0034 0.0052 0.0107 0.0244
(Basket 
IHP)i 
1,753,570 1,662,649 55,917 636,578 1,366,715 2,297,742 13,058,043
 
Panel C – Correlation Matrix 
 (BPB basket trading cost)i InvTVi InvNumofNamesi
InvTVi -0.43   
InvNumofNamesi -0.16 0.77  
(Basket IHP)i 0.85 -0.56 -0.34 
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Table VIII 
Calibrating the value of g 
 
By setting the value of g, the unloading rate, to 26.86% of ADV, the estimated value of 
α2 in the following model specification is calibrated to one.  
(BPB basket trading cost)i = α0 + α1InvNumofNamesi + α2(Basket IHP(g))i + εi, 
where 
i = 1, 2, 3, …, sample size of traded BPB baskets (i.e. identifier for each BPB basket), 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = fee (in dollars) paid by manager to BPB broker, 
InvNumofNamesi = 1 / Number of names being traded in a BPB basket i, 
(Basket IHP(g))i = ∑j Sj[2N(0.5σjE(√tj)) – 1], 
j = 1, 2, 3, …, number of stock names in BPB basket i, 
Sj = latest closing price for stock j, 
σj = standard deviation of return for stock j, 
tj = time taken to unload stock j from basket i which is a function of g, 
N(·) = cumulative unit normal density function. 
 
 (BPB 
 basket trading 
cost)i 
Inv 
Numof 
Namesi 
(Basket 
IHP)i 
intercept N R-sq 
Coeff Dep. Var. 41,078,664.54 0.9999 -389,918.73 196 74.91
T-stat 3.01 23.55 -2.45  
p 
value 
0.0030 0.0000 0.0152  
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Table IX 
Model inventory-holding premium as option collars 
In this model estimation, we model the inventory-holding premium, IHPC(g), as an 
option collar rather than an at-the-money option. When calculating the value of the out-
of-money option, we assume the strike price (X) is 0.5% away from the latest closing 
price (S). The unloading rate, g, continues to be 26.86% of ADV. 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = α0 + α1InvNumofNamesi + α2(Basket IHPC(g))i + εi, 
where 
i = 1, 2, 3, …, sample size of traded BPB baskets (i.e. identifier for each BPB basket), 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = fee (in dollars) paid by manager to BPB broker, 
InvNumofNamesi = 1 / Number of names being traded in a BPB basket i, 
(Basket IHPC)i = ∑j Sj[2N(0.5σjE(√tj)) – 1] - ∑j (out of money option with Xj is 0.5% 
away from Sj ), 
j = 1, 2, 3, …, number of stock names in BPB basket i, 
Sj = latest closing price for stock j, 
σj = standard deviation of return for stock j, 
tj = time taken to unload stock j from basket i which is a function of g, 
N(·) = cumulative unit normal density function, 
Xj = strike price for the out of money option for stock j. 
 (BPB basket 
trading 
cost)i 
Inv 
Numof 
Namesi 
(Basket 
IHPC)i 
intercept N R-sq 
Coeff Dep. Var. 82,245,474.84 5.4516 -887152.88 196 45.43 
T-stat  3.68 12.27 -2.95   
p value  0.0003 0.0000 0.0036   
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Table X 
Estimating the probability of informed trades and distribution of various trading 
cost components 
This table summaries the estimation result of the following regression model 
specification given by equation (3.16): 
(BPB basket trading cost)i = α0 + α1InvNumofNamesi + α2(Basket IHPU,i(g))i 
+ α3(Basket IHPI,i(g,q,c) - Basket IHPU,i(g) )i + εi, 
where 
InvNumofNamesi = 1 / (Number of names being traded in a BPB basket i), 
IHPU,i(g))i = inventory-holding premium for uninformed trades,  
IHPI,i(g,q,c) = inventory-holding premium for informed trades, 
g = unloading rate defined in equation (3.10), 
c = uninformed trade cutoff for IHPI,i defined in equation (3.14), 
q is defined in equation (3.13). 
 
During model estimation, we assume that q takes the values: 0.5%, 1%, 2%, and 3%, and 
that c takes the values 3% of ADV, 4% of ADV, and 5% of ADV. The table contains 
three vertical panels (A, B, and C), which correspond to three different values of c. For 
each panel, there are four estimation results (four sub-tables) that correspond to the four 
different values of q. Each sub-table has the following six columns: 
1. Name of dependent and independent variables. Trade Cost = (BPB basket trading 
cost)i which is the dependent variable. InvNames = 1 / (Number of names being 
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traded in a BPB basket i). IHPU = Basket IHPU,i(g) and IHPI = Basket 
IHPI,i(g,q,c). 
2. Estimated values for the regression intercept and coefficient of the independent 
variables (i.e. α0, α1, α2, and α3). 
3. T-statistics for each estimated values. 
4. Mean value for the dependent and independent variables. 
5. Mean trading cost contributed by each of the independent variables. 
6. Trading cost contributed by each independent variable expressed as a percentage 
of the mean BPB basket trading cost. 
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Table X (continued) – Panel A 
Estimating the probability of informed trades and distribution of various trading 
cost components 
In this panel, the uninformed trade cutoff (c) is assumed to be 3% of ADV. q takes the 
following values: 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.0%, and 3.0% as one goes down the panel. Each value of 
q corresponds to a sub-table in Table X. 
  
  c = uninformed trade cutoff = 3% of ADV 
 Var. Est. Coeff. T-stat Mean Val. Cost Contri.   
q = 0.5% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -333,136.75 -1.21 -333,136.75 -333,136.75 -20%
  InvNames 52,368,942.94 2.48 0.0075209 393,860.17 24%
  IHPU 0.8754 5.44 1,138,439.40 996,589.85 60%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.7885 2.48 780,207.93 615,193.95 37%
  R-sq = 51.00 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=0.77) 
q = 1.0% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -244,106.34 -0.88 -244,106.34 -244,106.34 -15%
  InvNames 47,866,879.42 2.25 0.0075209 360,000.72 22%
  IHPU 0.9656 6.18 1,138,439.40 1,099,277.08 66%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.2601 1.89 1,757,715.50 457,181.80 27%
  R-sq = 50.36 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=0.22) 
q = 2.0% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -209,995.89 -0.75 -209,995.89 -209,995.89 -13%
  InvNames 46,090,009.22 2.16 0.0075209 346,637.11 21%
  IHPU 0.9987 6.49 1,138,439.40 1,136,959.43 68%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.0990 1.67 4,029,030.40 398,874.01 24%
  R-sq = 50.16 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=0.01) 
q = 3.0% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -236,170.57 -0.85 -236,170.57 -236,170.57 -14%
  InvNames 47,405,547.96 2.23 0.0075209 356,531.11 21%
  IHPU 0.9759 6.31 1,138,439.40 1,111,003.01 66%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.0679 1.84 6,490,985.30 440,737.90 26%
  R-sq = 50.31 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=0.16) 
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Table X (continued) – Panel B 
Estimating the probability of informed trades and distribution of various trading 
cost components 
In this panel, the uninformed trade cutoff (c) is assumed to be 4% of ADV. q takes the 
following values: 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.0%, and 3.0% as one goes down the panel. Each value of 
q corresponds to a sub-table in Table X. 
  
  c = uninformed trade cutoff = 4% of ADV 
 Var. Est. Coeff. T-stat Mean Val. Cost Contri.   
q = 0.5% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -427,010.19 -1.62 -427,010.19 -427,010.19 -26%
  InvNames 56,661,845.96 2.77 0.0075209 426,146.55 25%
  IHPU 0.7446 4.61 1,138,439.40 847,681.98 51%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 1.1456 3.42 720,777.37 825,722.56 49%
  R-sq = 52.34 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=1.58) 
q = 1.0% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -344,589.39 -1.29 -344,589.39 -344,589.39 -21%
  InvNames 52,733,197.83 2.54 0.0075209 396,599.68 24%
  IHPU 0.8466 5.37 1,138,439.40 963,802.80 58%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.4055 2.78 1,619,197.90 656,584.75 39%
  R-sq = 51.39 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=0.97) 
q = 2.0% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -307,699.38 -1.14 -307,699.38 -307,699.38 -18%
  InvNames 50,894,526.69 2.44 0.0075209 382,771.27 23%
  IHPU 0.8904 5.74 1,138,439.40 1,013,666.44 61%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.1570 2.50 3,717,798.70 583,694.40 35%
  R-sq = 51.03 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=0.71) 
q = 3.0% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -329,615.91 -1.23 -329,615.91 -329,615.91 -20%
  InvNames 51,920,671.25 2.50 0.0075209 390,488.77 23%
  IHPU 0.8686 5.58 1,138,439.40 988,848.46 59%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.1037 2.66 6,004,184.80 622,633.96 37%
  R-sq = 51.23 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=0.84) 
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Table X (continued) – Panel C 
Estimating the probability of informed trades and distribution of various trading 
cost components 
In this panel, the uninformed trade cutoff (c) is assumed to be 5% of ADV. q takes the 
following values: 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.0%, and 3.0% as one goes down the panel. Each value of 
q corresponds to a sub-table in Table X. 
  
  c = uninformed trade cutoff = 5% of ADV 
 Var. Est. Coeff. T-stat Mean Val. Cost Contri.   
q = 0.5% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -559,354.83 -2.22 -559,354.83 -559,354.83 -33%
  InvNames 61,969,221.73 3.15 0.0075209 466,062.65 28%
  IHPU 0.5687 3.59 1,138,439.40 647,430.49 39%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 1.6767 4.79 666,984.83 1,118,333.46 67%
  R-sq = 54.83 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is significantly diff from 1 (t=2.72) 
q = 1.0% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -487,923.43 -1.90 -487,923.43 -487,923.43 -29%
  InvNames 58,964,487.98 2.94 0.0075209 443,464.43 27%
  IHPU 0.6799 4.37 1,138,439.40 774,024.95 46%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.6312 4.09 1,493,870.50 942,931.06 56%
  R-sq = 53.48 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is significantly diff from 1 (t=2.05) 
q = 2.0% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -452,102.41 -1.74 -452,102.41 -452,102.41 -27%
  InvNames 57,333,864.96 2.84 0.0075209 431,200.72 26%
  IHPU 0.7326 4.76 1,138,439.40 834,020.70 50%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.2504 3.76 3,431,949.50 859,360.15 51%
  R-sq = 52.89 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=1.74) 
q = 3.0% Trade Cost Dep. Var.   1,672,476.90   
  Intercept -469,808.59 -1.82 -469,808.59 -469,808.59 -28%
  InvNames 58,044,440.05 2.89 0.0075209 436,544.86 26%
  IHPU 0.7121 4.62 1,138,439.40 810,682.70 48%
  (IHPI-IHPU) 0.1612 3.91 5,553,416.00 895,210.66 54%
  R-sq = 53.16 
  estimated coefficient for IHPU is not significantly diff from 1 (t=1.87) 
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Chapter 4 
Decision to Trade Blind Principal Bid Basket – A 
Behavioral Perspective 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Previous studies (Kavajecz and Keim 2005; Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation) 
focus on how a BPB basket is priced. This chapter looks at a different, but related, 
question. We investigate how a manager decides to opt for executing a BPB basket rather 
than going through the traditional agency trade. A key feature of BPB is that a manager 
knows the trading cost before the basket execution, whereas when using agency trade the 
actual realized trading cost is unknown before execution. Choosing to use agency trade 
for execution is a decision under risk and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Wakker and Tversky 1993) might be able to predict a 
manager’s final choice (i.e., BPB vis-à-vis agency trade). We also investigate whether 
expected utility theory can also be used to model a manager’s behavior by estimating that 
manager’s absolute risk aversion. 
 
One contribution of this chapter is our unique data sample, and our results complement 
other studies that use data generated in an experimental or laboratory setting. In our 
sample, the trading decision is made by professional quantitative asset managers rather 
than by game show participants, as other studies have investigated (Gertner 1993; 
Metrick 1995; Beetsma and Schotman 2001; Fullenkamp et al. 2003). We studied real-
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life business decisions by managers who should be expected to have a better 
understanding of risk and reward due to the nature of their investment business than 
typical game show participants. This makes the analysis of their decisions quite 
interesting. 
 
Another important feature of our sample is that the monetary stake of a manager’s 
decision is very high. The average trading cost a BPB basket in our sample is 
$1.8 million. It is very difficult to simulate the effect of such high stakes in an 
experimental setting.57 High-stakes decisions are good for studying risk aversion in the 
framework of expected utility theory; as Rabin (2000a, 2000b) and Rabin and Thaler 
(2001) have argued, expected utility theory may not characterize the risk aversion 
properly when stakes are small. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes an 
implementation shortfall model we use to estimate the expected agency trading cost a 
manager incurs. In Section 4.3, we describe a simple model to estimate a manager’s 
absolute risk aversion under expected utility theory. Section 4.4 shows that a manager’s 
decision to use BPB for execution rather than agency trade is consistent with prospect 
theory’s prediction. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.  
                                                 
57 Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) tried to simulate the effect of high monetary stakes by 
conducting experiments in a country with a relatively low cost of living. 
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4.2. A model for a manager’s agency trading cost 
Since this chapter investigates a manager’s choice between a BPB basket and an agency 
trade,58 we need a model to measure the expected trading cost and the variance of the 
trading cost.  
4.2.1. A model for predicting implementation short fall 
We use an implementation shortfall model developed by Almgren et al. (2005)59 to 
compute the expected implementation shortfall for a stock. Borrowing their notation and 
results, the implementation shortfall, A, is a normal distribution random variable with its 
expected value (expressed in dollars), and variance (expressed in dollar squared) can be 
computed as follows: 
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where 
X = number of shares to be traded, negative for sell and positive for buy, 
S0 = closing price agreed to be used as the execution price for a BPB basket, 
γ = model parameter (estimated to be 0.314 ± 0.041), 
σ = daily volatility, 
V = average daily volume in shares,  
δ = model parameter (estimated to be 0.267 ± 0.22), 
                                                 
58 The agency trading cost is defined as implementation shortfall, as suggested by Perold 
(1988). 
 
59 One can also use other models as long as the model can provide an estimate of 
expected implementation shortfall and variance of the implement shortfall.  
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Θ = total shares outstanding, 
η = model parameter (estimated to be 0.142 ± 0.0062), 
sgn(X) = +1 if X > 0; -1 if X < 0, 
β = model parameter (estimated to be 0.600 ± 0.038), 
T = trade duration in days (i.e., time horizon to finish a trade), 
ε = agency trade broker commission (assumed to be 2 cents / share). 
 
For all market impact model parameters (γ, δ, η, and β), we use values estimated by 
Almgren et al. (2005). It is likely, though, that stocks in a basket have different liquidity 
requirement and hence take different time, T, to complete their execution. Realistically, a 
large position in a basket needs a longer time to trade than do smaller positions. 
Therefore, we introduce an extra variable that help us model T more effectively when 
dealing with a basket of stocks. The new variable, agency trading rate, g, is the 
percentage of average daily share volume a manager would like to execute in the agency 
trade in a given day (the unit for g is a percentage of average daily share volume). For 
example, if the average daily volume for a stock i in a basket is 1,000,000 shares and g = 
25% of average daily volume, then a manager plans to trade 250,000 shares of stock i in a 
day. Furthermore, if we assume 125,000 shares of stock i in a basket, then the manager is 
going to finish trading stock i in half a day (i.e. T = ½ and
g
V
X
T = ). We assume that g is 
exogenous in this study and that a manager has a trading rate in mind for agency trade 
execution.60 
                                                 
60 Typically, asset managers have some rule of thumb regarding the agency trading rate. 
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Both Bertsimas and Lo (1998) and Almgren and Chriss (2000) demonstrate that a 
implementation shortfall will be minimal if the trajectory for trading a block of shares 
(for a single name) spreads the shares evenly across a given time horizon, T. Another way 
to describe this trading trajectory is to trade shares at a constant rate. If a manager 
chooses a higher g (while all other variables remain the same), the expected 
implementation shortfall will increase and the variance of implementation shortfall will 
decrease. Similarly, if g decreases, so too will the expected implementation shortfall but 
the variance of implementation shortfall will increase.  
 
We also assume that trading a stock affects only the price of that stock and no other stock 
prices (i.e., it has no cross-impact effect). The expected implementation shortfall for a 
basket will then be the sum of the expected implementation shortfall for each name in a 
basket. The variance of implementation shortfall for a basket can be computed in a 
similar manner. Using this model, the implementation shortfall for executing a basket of 
stocks as agency trade is a normal random variable with finite expectation and variance. 
4.2.2. Historical BPB basket data 
We have gathered 196 blind principal bid baskets executed regularly by two asset 
managers.61 These baskets were traded between January 2002 and September 2005. One 
                                                 
61 We would like to thank a consulting firm specializing in securities transactions for 
providing transaction records for one of its managers. To ensure confidentiality, the 
names of the money manager and the winning brokers were excluded from the records 
before we received the data. We obtained a second set of transaction records from 
another asset manager. Both managers specialize in quantitative investment strategies. 
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manager uses only pre-open bidding and the other manager uses both pre-open and post-
close bidding. For each basket executed, we gather the following data items: 
1. Stock identifier (CUSIP or ticker) for each name in a basket, 
2. Transaction type for each name (buy or sell) in a basket, 
3. Number of shares traded for each name in a basket, 
4. Execution price62 for each name in a basket, 
5. Winning bid (which appears as cents per share in the data). 
The cost (in dollars) of trading a BPB basket can be computed as the total number of 
shares in a basket times the winning bid. Table XI provides descriptive statistics for some 
of the basket characteristics. For a given agency trading rate, g, we can compute the 
hypothetical expected implementation shortfall and variance of implementation shortfall 
for each basket in our sample using the method discussed in the previous section. 
4.3. Estimating a manager’s absolute risk aversion 
Expected utility theory provides a good starting point for our investigation to model a 
manager’s decision under risk. If a manager is risk neutral, the use of BPB – which 
provides a known trade cost before execution – provides no benefit. The maximum cost a 
risk-neutral manager is willing to pay to a BPB broker is the expected implementation 
shortfall. However, the cost of trading a BPB basket is typically more expensive than the 
expected implementation shortfall. If a manager is willing to pay a higher cost in 
exchange for a known trading cost, it indicates that he is risk averse when executing a 
basket. 
 
                                                 
62 As Section 4.1 details, the execution price for pre-open bidding is the previous day’s 
closing price, and for post-close bidding it is the same-day closing price. 
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In this section, we seek to estimate a manager’s absolute risk aversion (ARA) under the 
expected utility theory. We impose no assumptions on the shape of the manager’s utility 
function; our estimation is based on observing the manager’s behavior (i.e., his decision 
to trade BPB baskets). Other studies have employed this approach of characterizing risk 
aversion indirectly based on observations of decisions made by individuals (Beetsma and 
Schotman 2001; Jullien and Salanie 2000). An alternative approach is to use 
experimental procedures such as survey questionnaires regarding decision under risk to 
estimate the risk aversion. Donkers et al. (2001), Binswanger (1980) and Kachelmeier 
and Shehata (1992) have followed this alternative approach.  
4.3.1. A simple model to estimate the absolute risk aversion  
We use the following variables in describing the model and methodology: 
• A is the random variable representing the implementation shortfall when a basket is 
executed using an agency trade (as described in detail in Section 4.2). Recall that A 
follows a normal distribution with expectation E[A] and variance VAR(A) and they 
can be computed by equation (4.1) and (4.2). 
• Let σA be the standard deviation of the random variable A. 
• Let B be the BPB basket trading cost. 
To have a simpler model, we approximate A (which is a continuous random variable) by 
a two-state discrete random variable: 
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σ
σ .  (4.3) 
We model a manager’s implementation shortfall using only two states, with each state 
equally probable to occur. In the high state, the implementation shortfall is one standard 
deviation (σA) above E[A]. In the low state, the implementation shortfall is one standard 
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deviation (σA) below E[A]. This discrete random variable has the same expectation and 
variance as the continuous random variable A. Let us define H = E[A] + σA and L = E[A] 
– σA. In summary, if a manager executes a basket as an agency trade, his implementation 
shortfall (i.e., agency trading cost) is either H or L, with equal probability of 0.5. 
 
The following is a simple model we can use to estimate a manager’s absolute risk 
aversion under the expected utility theory framework. The technique used here is similar 
to that used by Brunello (2002) and Eisenghauer and Ventura (2003). By assuming B is 
the maximum BPB trading cost that a manager will pay such that he is indifferent about 
using either BPB or agency trade, we have the following equation in which U(·) is a 
manager’s utility function and W is wealth:  
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2
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2
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A Taylor series expansion of equation (4.4), ignoring higher order terms, gives the 
following equations: 
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In expected utility theory, the absolute risk aversion (ARA) is defined as
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rearranging the terms in equation (4.5), we can express a manager’s ARA using the 
following equation: 
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Using the BPB basket data described in Section 4.2.2, we can estimate a manager’s ARA 
by equation (4.6). The result of the ARA estimation is given in the next section. 
4.3.2. Result of Absolute Risk Aversion Estimation 
For each BPB basket, we can compute one observation of ARA based on equation (4.6). 
The mean of all the ARA observations in our sample of BPB baskets is our estimation of a 
manager’s ARA. There are 196 observations in our sample. We also conduct the 
following hypothesis testing: 
H0: Mean of ARA = 0 
H1: Mean of ARA > 0 
If expected utility theory can model a manager’s choice about how to execute a basket, 
then our prior is that the mean of the ARA observations should be significantly bigger 
than zero (i.e., reject the null hypothesis and the value of a manager’s ARA should be 
positive and non-zero). Since we assume the trading rate, g, is exogenous and the value of 
L and H is a function of g, we estimate the ARA and conduct the hypothesis testing for 
various values of g.  
 
Table XII summarizes the estimation of a manager’s ARA and the result of the hypothesis 
testing.63 The overall result is contradictory with our prior. For a trading rate equal to 
10%, 20%, and 40%, the estimated ARA is not significantly different from zero. For a 
trading rate equal to 30% and 50%, the estimated ARA is significantly negative. In 
summary, it appears that a zero or negative risk aversion may indicate that expected 
                                                 
63 In reality, it is very difficult for a manager to have an agency trading rate greater than 
30. The results in Table XII where the trading rate is greater than 30 are mainly for 
reference. 
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utility theory may be unable to model an asset manager’s decision to choose a method for 
executing a basket of stocks. In the next section, we test an alternative theory.  
4.4. Using Prospect Theory to predict a manager’s decision to 
trade a BPB basket. 
Prospect theory, invented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and further developed (such 
as the cumulative prospect theory) by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Wakker and 
Tversky (1993), is one of the alternative theories in modeling decision under risk, seeking 
to account for the discrepancy between individuals’ decision and the predictions of 
expected utility theory. Barberis and Thaler (2003) suggest that prospect theory is the 
most successful theory at capturing the experimental results in studying how individuals 
make decision. Expected utility theory is normative: it models how individuals should 
behave when faced with risky choice. Prospect theory, though, is descriptive: it models 
how individuals do behave when faced with risky choice. Trepel et al. (2005) outline 
some possible neural bases of the various components of prospect theory based on human 
imaging, lesion, and neuropharmacology. There is considerable evidence showing that 
people do not follow expected utility theory when making decisions under risk. A famous 
classic example is the Allais paradox documented by Allais (1953).  
 
In this study, we aim to use prospect theory to show that BPB (rather than agency trade) 
is indeed the preferred choice for the baskets executed by the managers. One can also 
view our analysis as a joint test of prospect theory vs. expected utility theory in the 
context of manager’s choice on how to execute a stock basket. In what follows, we 
describe our testing method and introduce some key features of prospect theory, 
including reference point, value function, weighting function, and the value of a gamble. 
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We continue to use the variables defined in Section 4.3 and approximate the 
implementation shortfall (which is a continuous random variable) by the same two-state 
discrete random variable.64  
4.4.1. Framing and reference point 
Framing refers to how a problem is posed for a decision maker. In expected utility theory, 
its Invariance assumption (axiom) makes framing irrelevant in decision making. 
However, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) shows that framing can affect the decision 
maker’s choice. The framing in our analysis is that a manager evaluates whether 
switching to agency trade is a better choice for executing a basket relative to using BPB. 
The reference point in a manager’s evaluation is the cost of trading a BPB basket (which 
is known to the manager when he needs to choose either BPB or agency trade for 
execution). Prospect theory argues that decision is made by evaluating gain or loss 
respective to a reference point. This argument is different from that of expected utility 
theory, which argues that decision is made based on the maximization of expected 
terminal utility. According to prospect theory, a manager will give up BPB and choose to 
use agency trade for execution only if the agency trade can provide a positive gain. 
 
There are three scenarios for describing the gain or loss of choosing agency trade.65 First, 
if B > H > L, there is a gain of (B – H) with 0.5 probability and a gain of (B – L) with 0.5 
probability. Second, if H > B > L, there is a loss of (H – B) with 0.5 probability and a gain 
                                                 
64 Equation (4.3) in Section 4.3.1. 
 
65 We continue to use the two-state discrete model, developed in Section 4.3, for the 
implementation shortfall of agency trade. 
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of (B – L) with 0.5 probability. Third, if H > L > B, there is a loss of (H – B) with 0.5 
probability and another loss of (L – B) with 0.5 probability.  
4.4.2. Value Function 
The purpose of the value function in prospect theory is to convert a gain or a loss, such as 
those we discussed in the previous section, to a subjective value. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) suggest the following value function v(x): 
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λ     (4.7) 
Both α and β are estimated to be 0.88 in their study; this value has becomes a standard 
assumption in prospect theory literature. λ is the coefficient of loss aversion, which 
measures the relative sensitivity to gains and losses and is estimated to be 2.25. 
Therefore, a decision maker attaches a more negative subjective value than the face value 
of (-x)β in case of a loss.  
4.4.3. Weighting Function 
The decision weights are weights an individual uses to compute the value of a gamble. In 
the expected utility theory framework, the decision weights are objective probabilities. In 
prospect theory, a weighting function performs a nonlinear transformation of the 
objective probability of a prospect (i.e., outcome in a gamble) to a decision weight.66 In 
this study, there are only two prospects (the high state and low state) when agency trade 
                                                 
66 One may think of the decision weight as subjective probability. 
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is used for execution. We use the following weighting function suggested by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992):67 
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where p is the objective probability. The estimated values of γ and δ are 0.61 and 0.69, 
respectively, in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). One of the interesting features of this 
weighting function is that it overweights small probabilities and underweights moderate 
and high probabilities. This models the subjective probabilities used by people as they 
make decisions. 
4.4.4. Calculate the value of choosing to use agency trade 
The value of a gamble to use agency trade for execution can be calculated by using the 
(cumulative) prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The intuition behind the 
calculation is that the value of a gain (or loss) from a manager’s perspective is based on 
the subjective value of gain and loss weighted by his perceived subjective probabilities. 
Let VA be the value of a gamble to choose agency trade for executing a basket. VA can be 
computed using the following formula: 
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67 There are several other common functional forms for the weighting function (see 
Goldstein and Einhorn 1987; Lattimore et al. 1992; Tversky and Fox 1995; Prelec 1998).  
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The ability to compute VA allows us to conduct a test on prospect theory’s prediction. If 
we compute the VA for each of BPB baskets in our sample, the mean of VA should be 
significantly less than zero. Our hypothesis is that a manager should attach a negative 
value to the gamble of choosing agency trade for execution (i.e., not switching to use 
agency trade for execution). Otherwise, the basket should have been executed using 
agency trade and should not appear in our sample of BPB baskets. Similar to the 
hypothesis testing conducted in Section 4.3, we conduct the following test for various 
values of g (trading rate): 
H0: Mean of VA = 0 
H1: Mean of VA < 0 
Table XIII summarizes the test results. The mean of VA is significantly negative in all 
different values of trading rate. At a low trading rate, a manager experiences a smaller 
expected implementation shortfall but higher variance of the implementation shortfall. To 
a loss-averse manager, the higher variance of implementation shortfall makes agency 
trade less attractive than BPB. Moreover, a lower trading rate means it will take a 
relatively longer time to complete the execution of a basket. For a BPB basket, the 
execution is immediate, which in turn makes agency trade less attractive. At a higher 
trading rate, however, the variance of implementation shortfall is smaller (and there is a 
shorter time to complete execution), but the higher expected implementation shortfall 
makes agency trade less attractive than BPB. Our test results are consistent with the 
prediction based on prospect theory. Since our sample is a set of baskets executed using 
BPB, we expect that the mean of VA is negative. The baskets with significant positive VA 
should have been executed using agency trade and should not be in our sample.  
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The concept of loss aversion, λ, in prospect theory captures a key element in a manager’s 
decision making process. A manager is more sensitive to potential loss than to potential 
gain, which makes a manager more reluctant to switch to agency trade. Regret effect is a 
related concept to loss aversion and can also strengthen our argument qualitatively. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) argue that one’s regret as a result of a loss due to one’s 
decision to act is stronger than the regret associated with one’s decision not to act. In the 
case of a manager’s decision, he already knows the exact BPB basket trading cost (i.e., 
the value of B in our model) when he needs to decide whether to give up the BPB basket 
execution (i.e., abandon the status quo). If he decides to trade a basket using agency trade 
for execution and incurs a loss, he will feel more regret. Hence, the regret effect tends to 
guide the manager not to act (i.e., not to switch to use agency trade) and to use BPB 
basket for execution. Overall, the manager’s decision to use BPB basket for execution is 
consistent with prospect theory.  
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter tests expected utility theory and prospect theory in modeling an asset 
manager’s choice between BPB and agency trade for executing a basket of stocks. Both 
theories can be used to model an individual’s decision under risk. If a manager follows 
expected utility theory, we should be able to estimate a manager’s absolute risk aversion 
(ARA). However, our estimation of ARA is not significantly different from zero. This 
result contradicts our expectation, since we know that a manager is risk averse when 
selecting a trade method for execution. We also test prospect theory as an alternative 
explanation for the manager’s choice. Applying prospect theory, we find that the manager 
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attaches a negative value to the choice of agency trade over BPB basket. This is 
consistent with the fact that these baskets are being traded using BPB. In summary, the 
test results indicate stronger empirical support for prospect theory than for expected 
utility theory in modeling a manager’s choice of trade execution method. 
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Table XI 
Descriptive statistics for some blind principal bid (BPB) basket characteristics 
 
There are 196 baskets used in this study. 
 
Basket 
Characteristics 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. 25th Median 75th Max. 
Number of names  
in a basket 
199 113 41 93 193 294 609
Total trade size  
($ million) 
333.99 239.56 20.09 146.20 268.09 487.05 1,188.14
Total number of shares 
(million) 
11.26 8.27 0.60 5.05 8.95 16.29 45.06
Names that are buys 
(%) 
45.59 9.34 13.14 40.06 46.24 50.73 100.00
Winning bid  
(basis points) 
53.57 33.00 8.95 26.90 44.79 73.42 164.75
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Table XII 
Estimation of a manager’s absolute risk aversion 
For each BPB basket, we compute one observation of a manager’s absolute risk aversion 
(ARA) using the equation:
222'
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−−=−= . L, H, and B are defined in 
Section 4.3.1. The mean of all ARA observations in our sample of BPB baskets is our 
estimation of a manager’s ARA.  
 
We also test the following hypothesis: 
H0: Mean of ARA = 0 
H1: Mean of ARA > 0 
Since we assume the agency trading rate, g, is exogenous and value of L and H is a 
function of g, we estimate the ARA and conduct the hypothesis testing for various values 
of g. 
 
Agency 
Trading 
Rate 
(% of  
average  
daily volume  
per day) 
Mean of 
ARA 
(10-6) 
H0: Mean of ARA = 0 
H1: Mean of ARA > 0 
T-stat p value 
10 3.31 Cannot reject H0 0.88 0.1912
20 -0.45 Cannot reject H0 -0.65 0.7420
30 -2.27 Mean of ARA Significantly < 0 -1.94 0.9733
40 0.88 Cannot reject H0 0.40 0.3461
50 -1.51 Mean of ARA Significantly < 0 -1.79 0.9626
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Table XIII 
Testing Prospect Theory’s Prediction 
For each of the BPB baskets in our sample, we compute the value of VA, which is the 
value of a gamble (from the perspective of a manager) to choose agency trade for 
execution rather than using BPB basket. The equation for VA is given below: 
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Our prior is that the mean of VA for our sample should be significantly less than zero. In 
other words, there is no positive gain for switching to agency trade. Otherwise these 
baskets should have been executed using agency trade and should not appear in our 
historical sample of BPB baskets. We conduct the following hypothesis testing for 
various values of g (agency trading rate): 
H0: Mean of VA = 0 
H1: Mean of VA < 0 
There are 196 BPB baskets in our sample; the result of the testing is given below. 
Agency 
Trading 
Rate  
(% of  
average  
daily volume  
per day) 
Mean of 
VA 
H0: Mean of VA = 0 
H1: Mean of VA < 0 
T-stat p 
value 
10 -257,947 Reject H0; VA significantly negative -2.29 0.0116
20 -254,942 Reject H0; VA significantly negative -2.23 0.0133
30 -266,149 Reject H0; VA significantly negative -2.32 0.0108
40 -282,176 Reject H0; VA significantly negative -2.44 0.0077
50 -300,339 Reject H0; VA significantly negative -2.59 0.0051
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